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Abstract
The role of information in today’s economy is essential as organizations that can
effectively store and leverage information about their stakeholders can gain an advantage in their
markets. The extensive digitization of business information can make organizations vulnerable to
data breaches. A data breach is the unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or confidential
data resulting in the compromise of information security. Data breaches affect not only the
breached organization but also various related stakeholders. After a data breach, stakeholders of
the breached organizations show negative behaviors, which causes the breached organizations to
face financial and non-financial costs. As such, the objective of this dissertation is to better
understand the effect of data breaches on the stakeholders of the breached organization and the
factors that can inhibit the negative behaviors. This dissertation uses a multi-method
investigation to examine two external stakeholders, customers and shareholders, in a data breach
aftermath. Essay 1 identifies data breach event and announcement characteristics and examines
the impact of these characteristics on the customers’ and shareholders’ behaviors. Essay 2
investigates the effective strategy that the breached organizations can adopt after a data breach
incident by examining the impact of various data breach response strategies. It also investigates
the effect of response times with respect to data breach notification laws on the stakeholders.
Each essay constitutes two studies with appropriate research methods for the two stakeholders
under investigation. The dissertation is expected to provide several implications for research and
practice.
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Introduction and Dissertation Overview
Organizational processes have become more digitized over the past decade and
companies have become more dependent on digital information. The role of information in
today’s economy is essential as organizations can store more information about their customers,
partners, and other stakeholders, and effectively leverage this information to lead their markets
(Martin et al. 2017). However, this increased dependency on digitally stored information leaves
the company vulnerable to unwanted data breaches.
A data breach is the unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or confidential data
resulting in the compromise or potential compromise of either confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of an information asset (Gordon et al. 2011). Industry reports show that data breaches
have a huge cost for the breached companies. For instance, Equifax has stated that its data breach
event in 2017 cost 1.4 billion dollars (Hurt 2019). Research also shows that data breaches have
considerable financial and non-financial costs for breached organizations (e.g., Choi et al. 2016;
Gwebu et al. 2018; Martin et al. 2017).
A data breach as an organization crisis affects not only the breached company but also
various stakeholders that relate to the breached organization (Gwebu et al. 2018). This
dissertation follows a holistic approach to investigate the effect of different elements of data
breaches on organizations and their stakeholders to give insight into cybersecurity practices and
researchers on the influential components of data breaches. Prior data breach studies find that
customers and shareholders are the primary stakeholders that show negative behaviors after the
data breach incidents (Choi et al. 2016; Gwebu et al. 2018; Martin et al. 2017; Yayla and Hu
2011). Thus, this dissertation investigates customers and shareholders to argue that data breach
incidence affects the stakeholders and, in return, the stakeholders show different negative
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reactions to the breached company. With this conjecture put forward, the objective of this
dissertation is to better understand the effect of data breaches on the stakeholders of the breached
company and the factors that can inhibit the negative behaviors. This dissertation incorporates
two essays in which a multi-method study is conducted to investigate customers and
shareholders in a data breach aftermath. Figure 1 shows a research model of this dissertation by
which we investigate various attributes of data breach events and examine their impacts in essay
1 and essay 2.
Essay 1 focuses on the characteristics of data breach event and post-event. Each data
breach event is unique in terms of the type of security attack and how the data breach is
announced to the public. Prior studies find that the announcement forms and security attack types
can have different effects on stakeholders (Liu et al. 2015; Yayla and Hu 2011). Thus, essay 1
examines whether the various characteristics of data breach announcements (i.e., information
source and information form) as well as various attributes of data breach events (attack and
disclosed information characteristics) differentially affect the stakeholders. If different data
breach characteristics have different impacts on organizations and their stakeholders,
organizations should allocate more resources (e.g., budget, time) to improve their defense system
against more influential threats.
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Figure 1. Dissertation Research Model
Essay 1 first collects data breach public announcements and, by doing a content analysis,
identifies and categorizes various attributes of data breach events that appear in the
announcements. Categorizing the characteristics based on announcements are important because
announcements trigger stakeholders’ negative behaviors after a data breach (Martin et al. 2017;
Yayla and Hu 2011). Perceptions of data breach events based on the type of information and the
severity of attacks are also examined to find if they stimulate the customers to show private and
public behaviors (switching behavior and negative word-of-mouth). Essay 1 also uses the socialmediated crisis communication model (Jin and Liu 2010) to understand the role of two
announcement sources (breached company and third-party) and three announcement forms
(traditional media, social media, and word-of-mouth) after data breaches. To this end, Essay 1
conducts a multi-method approach (Martin et al. 2017) by doing a series of experiments (2 x 2 x
2 scenario-based surveys) with 849 participants and an event study with data from 403 breached
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public companies to examine the effects of such characteristics on customers’ and shareholders’
behaviors. Essay 1 collects data about data breach characteristics and announcements from a
variety of sources including Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) website, National Vulnerability
Database (NVD), and Exploits Database (EDB) (exploit-db.com), and other security forums and
blogs. Market index data are also collected from various stock exchanges, such as CRSP and
Yahoo Finance.
Essay 2 focuses on the company response to their data breaches. Prior research discusses
that responding to a data breach can be challenging as a proper response is required to decrease
the negative consequences of the data breach (Gwebu et al. 2018). When companies become the
target of data breach attacks, it is vital that they have plans in order to cope with the data breach
event (Hamilton 2019). Prior research on data breaches emphasizes that if organizations
promptly respond to their data breach events and effectively address the concerns about data
leakage, they can minimize the cost of information disclosure. Bansal and Zahedi (2015) find
that organizational responses to the breaches can significantly repair customers’ damaged trust.
Choi et al. (2016) find that these responses relate to procedural justice, distributive justice, and
interactional justice, which ultimately affect customers’ psychological responses to data
breaches. However, organizations have different responses to data breaches and the effectiveness
of these different responses and their effects on the consequences of data breaches are not clear.
Essay 2 reviews and examines the responses made by the breached companies to find an
effective response that decreases the stakeholders’ negative actions. To do that, essay 2 collects
official data breach response letters issued by affected companies from various sources, such as
the websites of general attorneys, beached companies, news channels, and security forums. Then,
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essay 2 classifies different adopted response strategies and examines their effects on stakeholders
to find the strategy that mitigates negative behaviors more.
Response time also plays a key role to respond to a crisis when the stakeholders panic
and the breached company needs to soothe the stakeholders and control the situation. While a
fast response is advised, the data breach notification law allows the breached companies to make
an official notification much later—between 30 to 90 days after the breach (for a review of each
state law see National Conference of State Legislatures 2018). Thus, essay 2 also investigates if
the response time affects the stakeholders and whether it is beneficial to respond in the shortest
possible time.
Essay 2 uses expectancy violation theory (Burgon and Hale 1988) and crisis response
management literature to understand the effect of company response (apology, corrective action,
and compensation) and response time (short and long) on the stakeholders. To examine
expectancy violation theory regarding organizational response to data breaches, essay 2 conducts
a factorial survey, with 15 conditions and 811 responses, to find the most effective combination
of responses and times on customers and an event study to examine such effects on shareholders.
Essay 2 collects and reviews official response letters to the data breaches and examines if
various responses can decrease the negative effect of data breaches. To do so, essay 2 collects
data from a variety of sources including Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) website, National
Vulnerability Database (NVD), and Exploits Database (EDB) (exploit-db.com). Essay 2
conducts an event study and multivariate analyses to examine the effects of such characteristics
on the stakeholders’ behaviors. Event study data are collected through market index data from
various stock exchanges, such as CRSP and Yahoo Finance.
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This dissertation is expected to provide several research contributions as well as
implications for practice. First, there are a variety of security attacks that threaten the information
security of the companies. Prior cybersecurity research does not investigate if various
characteristics of security attacks have different influences on stakeholders. If it is the case, the
companies can invest more in influential areas, given the limited budget that they have for
information security. Second, this dissertation guides the researchers and practitioners about how
the companies should handle the situation after a data breach. In particular, this dissertation
studies if different data breach announcement sources (breached company vs a third party) and
forms (traditional media, social media, word-of-mouth) impact the stakeholders differently. It
enhances the knowledge of the companies to announce their data breach incidents more
effectively. Company responses to data breaches play a vital role to alleviate the tension raised
by data breaches. Breached companies adopt various response strategies and respond to data
breaches in different periods of time. This dissertation investigates the most effective response
strategy and time that the breached companies can use in a data breach aftermath. Finally, this
dissertation examines all these different aspects of data breaches on customers and shareholders
separately in each essay to understand if these aspects differentially affect each of these
stakeholders. The findings of this dissertation help the companies to minimize the negative
consequences of data breaches. Table 1 summarizes this dissertation and essays 1 and 2, in terms
of their research objectives, theoretical focus, and methodology.
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Table 1. Overview of Dissertation Essays
Research Objective
Dissertation

Essay 1

Essay 2

Investigating the effect of
data breach characteristics
on the stakeholders’
perceptions and behaviors
Examining the impact of
different characteristics of
data breach event and postevent on the stakeholders’
perceptions and behaviors

Theoretical Focus

Methodology

Data breach and
crisis management
literature

A multi-method
study with
individual and
organizational data
A series of
experiments as well
as an event study to
examine customers
and shareholders

Content analysis of
data breach
announcements,
Social-mediated
crisis communication
model
Expectancy violation
theory

Investigating the influence
of the breach company
response strategy and
response time on the
stakeholders after a data
breach
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Factorial survey
with 15 conditions
and event study to
examine customers
and shareholders
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Essay 1: Data Breach Announcements and Characteristics: Investigation of Customers and
Shareholders after Data Breaches
Introduction
Organizations are increasingly facing data breaches every year and the amount of
compromised data is on the rise. A recent report shows that only in the first half of 2019, the
number of exposed records in the U.S. reached 3.2 billion records and 3800 data breaches
transpired (Sanders 2019). The repercussions of data breaches are intense for the organization as
they lose reputation and revenue (Murphy 2019). The cost of data breaches is substantial because
when a data breach incident occurs, it not only influences the breached company but also various
stakeholders that have relationships with the breached company. For example, customers who
are the external stakeholders often terminate their relationships with the breached company (Choi
et al. 2016; Martin et al. 2017) and shareholders as the internal stakeholders show negative
actions in the stock market after a data breach (Yayla and Hu 2011).
To tackle data breach attacks, organizations persistently invest in IT security to protect
their business data against security threats. To illustrate, organizations’ expenditures on
information security solutions increased remarkably from 27 million dollars in 2010 to 66
million dollars in 2018 (Statistia 2019). Despite this significant IT security investment, data
breaches are still on the rise and have put an enormous amount of cost on organizations’
shoulders (Murphy 2019). A recent study by IBM states that the average cost of a data breach is
3.86 million dollars (IBM 2018). The increasing cost of data breaches on organizations implies
that the investment in IT security is insufficient or is not wisely allocated to the areas that are
important for stakeholders. Data breach events are complex and encompass various aspects that
differentially impact stakeholders. Prior research finds that data breaches have different
10

characteristics based on diversity of security threats and, subsequently, organizations differ in
their exposure to these threats (Posey et al. 2017). Thus, understanding the characteristics of data
breach events is important because if these characteristics differentially impact stakeholders,
companies can intelligently spend their limited budget on influential areas— decreasing the
negative consequences of data breaches.
Against this backdrop, prior data breach studies discuss various aspects of data breaches
that affect internal and external stakeholders (e.g., Bansel and Zahedi 2015; Choi et al. 2016;
Gwebu et al. 2018; Hovav et al. 2007; Martin et al. 2017; Yayla and Hu 2011). For example,
Yayla and Hu (2011) classify data breaches as denial of service (DoS), unauthorized access to
customer data, unauthorized access to employee data, website alteration, and unauthorized access
to company data. Hovav et al. (2017) propose another data breach classifications: attacker type,
attacker’s objective, attack results, attack tools, and access type. Despite these various
classifications, our review reveals two appreciable gaps in the literature.
First, prior data breach studies do not categorize data breach characteristics based on
pieces of information that appeared in data breach announcements. In fact, announcements drive
stakeholders’ behaviors because stakeholders realize the details of a data breach through the
contents of announcements. As the public commonly does not understand technical terms of data
breaches (Hovav et al. 2007; 2017), announcements lump various data breach specifications in
one camp so everyone understands the incident. Thus, the first objective of this research is to
categorize various data breach characteristics that appeared in data breach announcements and
examine the effects of these characteristics on the stakeholders of the breached company. If the
characteristics have differential impacts on stakeholders, companies can invest in the impactful
areas considering their limited budgets. It also contributes to cybersecurity research to identify
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different data breach event characteristics contained in the announcements and to understand
whether various data breach event characteristics distinctively influence internal and external
stakeholders.
Second, prior data breach studies do not investigate if data breach announcement
characteristics that relate to post data breach event decisions affect stakeholders. Based on the
social-mediated crisis communication model (SMCC), prior research argues that information
source and information form considerably influence the public’s crisis emotions and behaviors
(Jin and Liu 2010; Liu et al. 2011). Data breach events differ in the source of announcements to
the public. For example, while Facebook data breach in 2018 was announced by a third-party,
Capital One itself released a statement alerting customers about its data breach event in 2017.
Information form is another facet of data breach announcements because the public hears about
the data breaches through different news channels. Social media is an influential form of crisis
announcement (Liu et al. 2011) that can exacerbate the negative effect of data breach events on
stakeholders. Consequently, the second research objective is to understand if different types of
data breach announcements (i.e., source and form) differentially affect breached company
stakeholders’ behaviors. Understanding the impact of the announcement characteristics helps the
companies to depreciate the data breach negative effect by appropriately announcing their
incidents. It also extends crisis communication management literature to identify the
announcement characteristics that matter in a data breach crisis.
Prior data breach research identifies customers (e.g., Goode et al. 2017; Gwebu et al.
2018) and shareholders (e.g., Martin et al. 2017; Yayla and Hu 2011) as the main stakeholders
that are greatly affected by a data breach incident. Thus, we investigate both customers and
shareholders and examine how different aspects of a data breach event affect these stakeholders’
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behaviors in the same manner. Next, we first review prior research in this area followed by
delineating the theoretical foundations. Then, we conduct two separate studies for investigating
customers and behaviors and testing the research model. In study 1, we conduct a series of 2 x 2
x 2 scenario-based surveys (n = 849) to examine customer’s behaviors and, in study 2, we
conduct an event study with breached publicly traded companies (n = 403) to examine the impact
on shareholders. We finally present a discussion of implications for research and practice.
Background and Theoretical Foundation
A data breach is the unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or confidential data
resulting in the compromise or potential compromise of either confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of an information asset (Choi et al. 2016). To better understand the potential impacts
of data breaches, we first review prior data breach studies to find how data breaches affect
stakeholders’ behaviors. We then discuss various classifications of data breaches and how
identifying characteristics based on announcements differ. We finally do a content analysis of
data breach announcements (n = 403) and present the characteristics of data breaches in this
section.
Data Breach and Stakeholders’ Behaviors
Prior data breach research finds two main stakeholders of the breached company that
reciprocate the incident—customer and shareholder. Table 1 shows prior data breach studies
with the main findings regarding customer’s and shareholder’s behaviors.
The studies that look into customers find that data breach incidents affect behaviors, such
as switching behavior, word-of-mouth (WOM), customer spending and shopping (e.g.,
Chakraborty et al. 2016; Choi et al. 2016; Janakiraman et al. 2018; Martin et al. 2017). A group
of these studies examines the factors that increase and decrease the likelihood of behaviors in a
data breach aftermath. For example, Choi et al. (2016) find that perceived breach and feelings of
13

violation increase switching behavior and decrease WOM. Another group of studies examines if
individual differences affect post data breach behaviors. In this regard, Chakraborty et al. 2016)
find that elderly and young people have different perceptions and behaviors after a data breach.
Some other studies investigate if breached company responses can decrease customer’s negative
behaviors. For instance, Goode et al. (2017) study the Sony PlayStation Network data breach and
find that providing compensation to the affected customers can be effective only under certain
conditions such as when the expectation of compensation is small and within the perceived zone
of customers’ tolerance.
To investigate shareholder’s behavior, data breach studies use cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) to understand the stock market reaction to data breach events. These studies
unanimously find that the average of CAR after data breach announcements are negative (Gay
2017; Goel and Shawky 2009; Gwebu et al. 2018; Richardson et al. 2019; Yayla and Hu 2011).
While some studies find that the negative CAR is considerable (e.g., Malhotra and Malhotra
2011), others find that the effect to be negligible (e.g., Richardson et al. 2019). This discrepancy
in the magnitude of negativity suggests that there are also other factors that affect CAR in a data
breach aftermath. For example, Yayla and Hu (2011) find that when data breaches are a result of
DOS attacks, they affect CAR more than when unauthorized access leads to information
disclosure. Gwebu et al. (2018) assert the importance of company responses after data breaches
and find that defensive, moderate, and accommodative responses differentially affect CAR.
Despite the fact that prior data breach studies shed light on customer’s and shareholder’s
behaviors after a data breach, they suffer from two shortcomings. First, although prior data
breach studies use different data breach classifications, these classifications do not come from
the announcements. Regardless of the technical aspects of data breaches, the public reacts to the
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data breaches based on the information in announcements. Announcements are important
communication means after a data breach because stakeholders behave after reading a data
breach announcement (Martin et al. 2017). In other words, announcements are the primary
drivers of stakeholders’ behaviors in a data breach aftermath. Second, although prior data breach
studies investigate different facets of data breach events, the studies separately examined these
facets with either customers or shareholders. Thus, it is not clear if different data breach
attributes have the same effects on different stakeholders of the breached company. If an
attribute is influential on more than one stakeholder, it helps companies to allocate more security
resources to that attribute and better prioritize information security investments.
Table 1. Prior Data Breach Research on Stakeholders’ Behaviors
Study
Richardson et al.

Year
2019

Stakeholder
Shareholder

Rosati et al.

2019

Shareholder

Outcomes
CAR, future
company
performance,
future fees,
future ICMW
CAR

Gwebu et al.

2018

Shareholder

CAR

Janakiraman et al.

2018

Customer

Gay

2017

Shareholder

Customer
spending,
Channel
migration
behavior
CAR

Goode et al.

2017

Customer

Service quality,
Continuance
intention,
Repurchase
intention
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Finding
Data breaches result in small
negative CARs. The difference in
CARs between a breached company
and the matched companies vanish
within days after the breach.
Social media presence exacerbates
the negative stock price and it
depends on traditional media
visibility.
Response strategies mitigate the
negative financial impact of a breach
on lower-reputation firms but they
matter less for high-reputation firms.
Data breach decreases customer
spending and customers with higher
retailer patronage are more
forgiving.
The negative effect of data breach
announcement is offset by an
increase in the effect of a larger
number of positive news reports
released by the breached company.
Providing compensation to the
affected customers can be effective
only under certain conditions.

Table 1 (Cont.)
Study
Hovav et al.

Year
2017

Stakeholder
Shareholder

Outcomes

Martin et al.

2017

Customer,
Shareholder

Falsifying
information,
Negative WOM,
Switching
behavior

Choi et al.

2016

Customer

WOM, Switching
behavior

Chakraborty et al.

2016

Customer

Post-breach
shopping
intention

Bansal and Zahedi

2015

Customer

Repaired trust

Hinz et al.

2015

Shareholder

CAR

Yayla and Hu

201

Shareholder

CAR

Malhotra and
Malhotra

2011

Shareholder

CAR

Goel and Shawky

2009

Shareholder

CAR

CAR

Finding
Korean market reaction to cyber
incidents was relatively slow and the
market reaction to security incident
announcements varied over time as
the nature of cyber-attacks and
attackers changed.
Transparency and control in data
management practices of company
suppress the negative effects of
customer data vulnerability and
affect focal firm and rival firm
performances.
Justice perceptions and
psychological responses can explain
customer’s behavior after a data
breach.
Older generation and younger
generation might have different
perceptions and behaviors after a
data breach.
The effect of breached company
response strategies is contingent
upon the type of data breaches that
result from hacking and
unauthorized sharing.
The share prices of both directly
affected and similar companies
decrease after a data breach.
Stock market reactions to data
breaches vary in business type,
industry, type of breach, event year,
and length of the event window.
Breached companies suffer
significant market value depreciation
over a short as well as a long time
window.
Data breach announcements have a
negative effect on the market value
of breached companies.

The few studies that investigated both customers and shareholders together also used
different models for each of the stakeholders (e.g., Martin et al. 2017). Thus, it is unknown if a
data breach characteristic that affects customers has the same effect on shareholders. In this
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research, we examine the effect of data breach characteristics on customers as the same on
shareholders to understand whether these characteristics have the same effects on different
stakeholders. It also provides robust findings to enhance the knowledge of the impactful data
breach characteristics.
Data Breach Characteristics in the Announcements
Data breaches stem from security attacks and the research has noted several different
security attack classifications. For example, Howard (1997) provides a security attack taxonomy
and suggest four attack characteristics: (a) the tools employed for the attack (e.g., scripts), (b) the
outcome of the attack (e.g., DoS), (c) the type of access (e.g., unauthorized access), and (d) the
attacker’s objective (e.g., financial gain). Based on Howard’s taxonomy, Hovav et al. (2007)
develop five data breach characteristics, namely attacker type, attacker’s objective, attack results,
attack tools, and attack type. Yayla and Hu (2011) argue a different classification and categorize
data breaches into DoS, unauthorized access to customer data, unauthorized access to employee
data, website alteration/defacement, and unauthorized access to company data. Posey et al.
(2017) provide a different data breach taxonomy that is based on the type of information theft,
such as education data, financial data, health data, and identity theft and fraud.
Although different classifications could be applied to data breaches, the public does not
understand the technical details of attacks and the various technologies used by attackers (Hovav
et al. 2017). In fact, stakeholder’s perception of the data breach incident and the subsequent
behavior contingent upon the pieces of information presented in the announcements. Data
breaches are complex events that encompass many different facets but only specific data breach
attributes are presented in the announcements. When stakeholders realize a data breach incident
through social media, friends, and traditional media, they receive a short statement that involves
specific pieces of information. However, prior data breach research has not identified what
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information is announced to the public and whether stakeholders (i.e., customers and
shareholders) differentially act depending on various pieces of information. Thus, in this
research, we analyze the content of announcements and classify different pieces of information.
Content Analysis of Data Breach Announcements
To better understand what data breach characteristics are presented in the data breach
announcements, we did a content analysis data breach announcements. We first collected data
breach announcements from various sources, such as the breached organization website, state
attorney general websites, news websites, and security blogs and forums. Consequently, we
could collect 403 data breach announcements of publicly traded companies that faced data
breach incidents from 2005-2018. Then, we read the announcements rigorously and found a
pattern among the announcements in terms of data breach characteristics. Based on the common
pattern that exists in almost every data breach announcement, we coded and categorized different
facets of data breaches (Appendix A shows an illustrative announcement). Although data breach
announcements also provide information about company responses, we concentrated only on the
pieces of information that describe data breach characteristics. Table 2 shows that data breach
announcements postulate information about the attack and disclosed information. We found that
announcements describe what happened to the breached company by indicating whether the
attacker was from an external source (e.g., hackers) or an internal source (e.g., an employee).
The announcements also describe whether attackers used digital communication (e.g., hacking a
server) or stole physical assets (e.g., a laptop) to obtain information. The characteristics of
disclosed information is another aspect of data breaches that announcements depict. Data breach
announcements express whether disclosed information is sensitive (e.g., social security number)
or non-sensitive (e.g., first and last name) and specify the number of records affected by a data
breach (Appendix A).
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Table 2. Data Breach Characteristics Included in the Announcements
Data Breach Characteristics
Description
Attack
Attack Source
Internal
Attack happened from inside the
Characteristics
company (e.g., by an employee).
External
Attack happened from outside the
company (e.g., by a hacker).
Attack Strategy Digital
Attacker used digital communication to
gain information (e.g., hacking a
website).
Physical
Attacker used physical assets to gain
information (e.g., stealing a laptop).
Disclosed
Sensitivity
Sensitive
Sensitive information was disclosed
Information
(e.g., social security number)
Characteristics
Non-sensitive Non-sensitive information was
disclosed (e.g., first name and last
name)
Severity
Number of
Total number of records that were
Records
disclosed by a data breach.
Aside from the contents of announcements, individuals recognize data breaches through
different channels (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, a friend, TV). We also found that while some
breached companies announce their data breaches, a high number of data breaches is first
published by third-parties. For example, in 2018, The New York Times and The Observer
reported that Cambridge Analytica Ltd (CA) had achieved and used personal data about
Facebook users from an external researcher who had told Facebook he was collecting it for
academic purposes (Deagon 2018).
We believe that in addition to the characteristics of data breaches conveyed in the
announcements, the channel and the source of announcements affect stakeholders. Crisis
communication research also signifies the importance of the announcements attributes (e.g., Liu
et al. 2012). However, prior data breach research does not investigate if the attributes of
announcements can affect stakeholders’ behaviors. Thus, we recognize these attributes in this
study and adopt the social-mediated crisis communication model (SMCC) to comprehend the
characteristics of an announcement in a data breach aftermath.
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Social-Mediated Crisis Communication Model
Prior research uses the SMCC model (Figure 1) as a framework for crisis communication
management in the changing media landscape (Austin et al. 2012; Jin and Liu 2010; Liu et al.
2012). The model is divided into two parts that explain (a) how the source and form of crisis
information affect organizations’ response options and (b) recommended social-mediated crisis
response strategies. Crisis information form is whether the crisis information is transmitted via
traditional media, social media, and/or offline word-of-mouth communication (Liu et al. 2012).
To understand how the organization can best position itself as the preferred source for crisis
information, crisis managers need to understand how crisis information form and source affect
the public’s levels of acceptance of different organizational crisis response strategies (Liu et al.
2011).
As the SMCC model is well-established in crisis communication research (Jin and Liu
2010), it can also be applied in the data breach context because data breaches are a type of crisis
(Martin et al. 2017). Further, the SMCC model argues that crisis communications differ in the
source and form and data breach announcements come from different sources (i.e., breached
company or a third-party) and through different forms (e.g., social media, WOM, traditional
media). Thus, the SMCC model is an appropriate model to study post data breach characteristics.
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Information Source

Information Form

Social Media

Company

Crisis Information

WOM

Third-Party

Traditional Media

Figure 1. Social Mediated Crisis Communication Model (Adapted from Jin and Liu 2010)
Research Framework and Hypotheses Development
Based on the prior discussion of data breach characteristics, content analysis of
announcements, and the SMCC model, we present our conceptual model, as shown in Figure 2.
Although companies face numerous security attacks every day, the safeguard measures defend
most of the attacks. As such, the process of a data breach event starts with a successful attack
from attackers who are located outside or inside of the company. After penetrating the security
systems of a company by using digital communications or stealing physical assets of the
company, attackers are able to access company information that can be sensitive or non-sensitive
and have a different number of records. This process is reflected in announcements that are
published by a third-party or the breached company itself. Finally, stakeholders receive such
announcements through various forms, such as social media.
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Data Breach Event Characteristics
Attack Characteristics

Data Breach Post-Event Characteristics

Disclosed Information Characteristics

Attack Source

Sensitivity

Attack Strategy

Severity

Announcement Characteristics

Announcement
Source

Announcement Form

Figure 2. Data Breach Event and Post-Event Characteristics Regarding Announcements
Based on the conceptual model (Figure 2), we build our research framework to assess the
stakeholder’s behaviors with respect to announcements. Figure 3 shows our research framework
that assesses customer’s and shareholder’s behaviors in a data breach aftermath. We choose
customers and shareholders as the key stakeholders of a breached company because prior data
breach research extensively finds that customers and shareholders react to data breaches (e.g.,
Choi et al. 2016; Goode et al. 2017, Gwebu et al. 2018; Martin et al. 2017; Yayla and Hu 2011).
We choose switching behavior and negative WOM as customer’s behaviors because prior
research finds that customers switch to another company or spread negative words about the
breached company after a data breach event (e.g., Choi et al. 2016; Martin et al. 2017). We also
use CAR, which is the difference between the real stock price and the expected stock price, as
another dependent variable to understand shareholder’s behavior. We choose CAR because prior
research finds shareholders react negatively in the stock market after a data breach (e.g., Hovav
et al. 2017; Richardson et al. 2019; Yayla and Hu 2011).
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Announcement Contents (Data Breach Characteristics)
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Digital
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Non-sesnitive
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Social Media
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Figure 3. Research Framework
The Impact of Attack Characteristics
Companies face security threats from external entities that attempt to penetrate the
security barrier of the company or from internal entities that are in the boundary of the company
and have more information about the existing security measures. As such, prior security research
distinguishes between these two sources and incorporates the source as one of the main
categories of security threats (Loch et al. 1992; Willison and Warkentin 2013). Each of these
sources requires different procedures to attack the company and gain company information
(Howard 1997). External attackers require to put tremendous time and effort, such as IP and port
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screening and service vulnerability checking, to find an opportunity to gain company
information. On the other hand, inside attackers already have (a) access privileges and (b)
intimate knowledge of internal organizational processes that facilitate exploiting weaknesses
(Willison and Warkentin 2013). As a result, while stakeholders may view internal attacks as an
error or the incidents that are hard to control, they consider successful external attacks as a
company’s failure to fend off intruders and protect “secured” data (Hovav et al. 2007). The
stakeholders’ expectation about protecting external threats is higher than controlling internal
intruders. In fact, external attacks are more likely to violate stakeholders’ expectations about
information protection and get more publicity (Hovav et al. 2007). Thus, we hypothesize that
H1: External attacks increase (a) switching behavior and (b) negative WOM and decrease (c)
CAR more than internal attacks.
Data breaches stem from a variety of attacks including hacking database servers, website
alterations, DoS attacks, stealing important physical documents (e.g., employee data, source
codes), and mobile devices theft, etc. Although the level of sophistication of attack tools is
increasing and new methods and technologies are used to have unauthorized access to
information, data breach announcements do not contain jargon and technical terminologies. As a
matter of fact, our content analysis shows that announcements use general terms about the
attacks in order to be understood by non-technical people. For example, while session hijacking
is the cause of a data breach, the relevant announcement simply indicates that the data breach
was the result of hacking. In a broader sense, the various attacks can be categorized into those
that use digital communications and those that use physical access to gain information.
Companies usually have several different database servers and store different sets of data
(e.g., customers, financial, sales, employees). Therefore, when there is a successful digital attack,
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it is not clear what set(s) of data attackers accessed. In many cases, while attackers initially
intended to access a specific set of data (e.g., customer data), they found other sets of data (e.g.,
sales data)— especially if the hacked server stores different datasets or directly connected to
another database server. It causes the companies to spend a great amount of time to assess the
damage of data breach and find the affected data. On the other hand, the scope of physical
attacks is limited and, for example, when a laptop is stolen, the company knows what
information is stored in the laptop and is able to react quickly. Prior data breach research studies
also find that digital attacks significantly affect stakeholders. For instance, Yayla and Hu (2011)
find that DoS attacks (a digital attack) provide more negative effects than other types of attacks.
As digital attacks use sophisticated tools to penetrate systems, they are able to extensively access
the company network and comprehensively obtain the company information more than physical
attacks. Further, a successful digital attack demonstrates that despite efforts, investments, and
resources allocated to the IT systems, the information systems infrastructure of the company is
vulnerable and provides opportunities for future data breaches. Thus, we hypothesize:
H2: Digital attacks increase (a) switching behavior and (b) negative WOM and decrease (c)
CAR more than physical attacks.
The Impact of Disclosed Information Characteristics
Data breaches disclose different types of information, such as customers’ information,
financial and sales information, source code of the software, trade secrets, employee information,
etc. Despite its type, disclosed information can be sensitive or non-sensitive. Sensitive
information is confidential and creates more costs than non-sensitive information. For example,
attackers can use sensitive information such as social security numbers for fraudulent purposes
and commit other non-digital crimes by identity theft. Although sensitivity perception may vary
with individual differences and business processes, some types of information, such as medical
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and information, are generally considered sensitive and information, such as name and email
address, is perceived less or non-sensitive information (Malhotra et al. 2004). Prior research
argues that disclosing sensitive information is riskier than non-sensitive information (Milne and
Gordon 1993). Privacy studies vastly find that individuals are concerned about disclosing
sensitive information than non-sensitive information (e.g., Bansal and Gefen 2010; Malhotra et
al. 2004; Novak and Phelps 1992; Sheehan and Grubbs Hoy 2000). In the data breach context
also, Campbell et al. (2003) compare the effect of data breaches involving confidential
information and those with non-confidential on the stock market and find that the stock market
negatively reacts to data breaches with confidential information. In this light, we believe that
after a data breach when stakeholders realize that sensitive information is disclosed, they show
negative behaviors more than non-sensitive information. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H3: Sensitive disclosed information increase (a) switching behavior and (b) negative WOM and
decrease (c) CAR more than non-sensitive disclosed information.
The other facet of information disclosure due to data breaches is the severity of data
breaches. Data breach severity refers to the scope and the magnitude of a data breach impact
(Martin et al. 2017). While some data breaches reveal a low number of records, in other cases,
attackers gain a multitude of records. For example, an American Airline employee used a
skimming device in 2011 and obtained credit card information of 350 customers
(Databreaches.net news). On the other hand, attackers could exploit a vulnerability in the
Facebook computer network in 2018 and accessed the personal information of 50 million users
(New York Times 2018). Although stakeholders might have different perceptions of data breach
severity, a higher number of disclosed records is commonly associated with a higher level of
severity (Martin et al. 2017).

26

Prior security research finds the link between severity perception and coping behaviors.
In particular, protection motivation theory (PMT) research discusses that threat severity
perception increases fear and, subsequently, enhances protection motivation (Boss et al. 2015;
Chen and Zahedi 2016). Martin et al. (2017) also find that the negative effect of data breach
vulnerability on firm performance is aggravated by the severity of the firm’s data breach.
Similarly, we believe that massive data breaches have more negative effects than data breaches
with a lower number of revealed records. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H4: A higher level of severity is associated with a higher level of (a) switching behavior and (b)
negative WOM and a lower level of (c) CAR.
The Impact of Announcement Characteristics
Crisis communication research uses the SMCC model to understand the effect of various
communication forms and categorize different announcement channels. The SMCC model states
that individuals receive crisis announcements via three forms, namely social media, traditional
media, and WOM communication (Jin and Liu 2010). However, crisis communication research
argues that the effect of each information form on individuals’ perceptions and behaviors is not
the same. With the proliferation of social media platforms and increasing use of social media
apps and websites, the role of social media after crisis has become salient. Individuals tend to use
social media during a crisis because they believe that social media provide an unfiltered, up-todate line of communication (Procopio and Procopio 2007) and offer unique information that
individuals are not able to find elsewhere (Austin et al. 2012; Bucher 2002; Sutton et al. 2008).
Mass communication research also indicates that the higher intensity of media discussion about a
topic can affect individuals more because human behavior can be explained by environmental
influences (Bandura 2001). Likewise, we believe that when a data breach incident is a hot topic
in social media and there is a myriad of posts and tweets about a data breach event, stakeholders
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become more influenced by the data breach event and their negative behaviors raise. Thus, we
hypothesize that:
H5: Social media intensity regarding a data breach event increases (a) switching behavior and
(b) negative WOM and decreases (c) CAR.
Individuals realize a data breach from various sources, such as friends, TV, online news
websites, and social media. According to the SMCC model, crisis information sources can be
classified based on whether it is self-reported by the organization or from a third party outside of
the organization (Liang et al. 2011). Data breaches are also announced by either the breached
company or a third party. Breached companies are required to announce data breaches and notify
affected stakeholders based on data breach notification laws. However, there are several reasons
why a third party such as a journalist, a hacker, and an anonymous hater announce the data
breach earlier than the breached company. First, although data breach notification laws impose
the breached companies to notify the incidents, the legal time frame for the notification differs
from state to state and states allow the breached company to delay their responses. For instance,
Florida allows the breached organizations to prompt the stakeholders within 30 days after the
data breach incident and Alabama and Ohio allow 45 days. Thus, this legal delay provides an
opportunity for a third-party to announce the data breach earlier. Second, some breached
companies intentionally attempt to cover the data breach and do not announce their incidents.
For instance, Uber did not disclose its data breach incident that exposed personal data on 57
million people in November 2016 and instead paid $100,000 to keep the two perpetrators of the
theft silent (Vijayan 2018). While a company is covering its data breach, a third-party might find
it out and announces the data breach to the public.
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Announcing a data breach by a third-party negatively signals the stakeholders in several
ways. First, an announcement by a third-party conveys that the breached company is not aware
of the incident and its security systems have not been able to detect the attack. Second, it might
also show that the breached company deliberately covers the data breach and the company either
does not care about the stakeholders or does not intend to legally respond to the event. As in the
world of public perception, the first mover has the advantage (Temin 2015), we believe that an
announcement by a third-party provides more negative effects. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H6: Third-party announcements increase (a) switching behavior and (b) negative WOM and
decrease (c) CAR more than breached company announcements.
Methodology
In this research, we examine customer’s and shareholder’s behaviors with respect to
different data breach characteristics. Given the two different stakeholders with different
dynamics involved in the models, we adopt a multi-method approach by conducting two studies.
In study 1, we design a series of 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects experiments to assess customer’s
responses to data breaches. We follow prior research that uses experiments (scenario-based
surveys) to examine customer’s behaviors after a data breach (e.g., Choi et al. 2016; Martin et al.
2017). In study 2, we conduct an event study to understand shareholder’s behavior as the event
study is a well-established method to examine shareholder’s behaviors and is appropriate to find
the stock market reaction following a data breach (e.g., Gwebu et al. 2018; Richardson et al.
2019; Yayla and Hu 2011). We provide the results of each study and provide a meta interference
of results in the discussion section.
Study 1: Experimental Design
We designed a series of scenarios to measure and understand the effect of some data
breach characteristics on customer’s switching behavior and negative WOM. The scenarios
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enabled us to create notifications of data breach incidents with various characteristics. The
scenarios were based on those variables for which established scales were not available in the
literature and the participants’ perceptions needed to be assessed in different data breach
contexts. Further, scenario-based methods are principally used in prior research to understand
individuals’ behaviors in security-related settings (Han et al. 2015). Thus, we designed a series
of 2 (external vs internal) x 2 (digital vs physical) x 2 (breached company announcer vs thirdparty announcer) full factorial scenarios. However, we adapted the measurement scales from
prior literature to investigate the other variables of the research model, as discussed later.
In our scenario-based survey, we first asked participants to mention the name of a
company that they actually use and need to provide some personal information to get
service/product. Then, we provided a brief description of a data breach incident regarding the
company that the participants mentioned and the participants were asked to answer the questions
about the independent variables of the study (Appendix B). Afterward, the participants were
randomly assigned to one of eight scenarios and, then, required to answer the questions about the
manipulation checks and the dependent variables (Appendix B).
Measurement Items
We adapted the measurement items from prior research and only the language was
tweaked where necessary (Appendix C). We borrowed the scales of switching behavior and
negative WOM from Choi et al. (2016) and Martin et al. (2017), respectively. We adapted the
items of severity from Chen and Zahedi (2016) and those of information sensitivity from Bansal
et al. (2010). We also adapted the items of social media intensity impact from Chung (2019). All
items are 7-point Likert scales.
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Data Collection Procedures
We followed a systematic approach to collect data, which constitutes three phases—
pretest, pilot study, and primary study. In the pretest phase, we solicited five IS researchers who
had a Ph.D. to review our survey and provide feedback. They gave us several suggestions about
the scenarios and the clarity of the survey items. Therefore, we conducted a verbal protocol and
reviewed the questions one-by-one to ensure the clarity of items. Then, we revised the scenarios
and made the survey items clearer and appropriate to the data breach context based on the
suggestions and the verbal protocol.
In the pilot study, we collected data from 115 respondents with U.S adults over 18 who
provide personal information to receive online services. We used the pilot study to do
preliminary analyses such as reliability and validity of constructs, clarity of scenarios, and
manipulation checks. We also added an open-ended question at the end of the pilot study survey
and asked for suggestions and the clarity of questions. Based on the pilot study feedback, we
made some minor adjustments for the pilot study.
For the primary study, we initially collected 1000 responses from CloudResearch1 by
monetary incentivizing US respondents. The requirement to participate in this study was being
an adult over 18 years of age who provides personal information to purchase products/services
from retail outlets. We removed the responses that did not correctly answer the pay-attention
questions or took the survey in a very short time (i.e., less than five minutes)2. Finally, the
sample size of the primary study data was 849 for further analyses, which was ample to have the
power of 0.9, with a medium-size effect and 0.05 significance level, for each of eight groups of

1

CloudResearch is a crowdsourcing platform that enables researchers to collect data from a diverse pool of
participants.
2
We found five minutes is appropriate threshold based on the pilot study results.
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the scenario-based survey (Liang et al. 2019). Demographics of primary study participants
(Appendix D) show the demographics of participants and includes information about gender,
age, marriage, internet experience, income, and education.
Common Method Variance
A potential issue in survey-based research is a common method variance that can provide
flawed results and misleading interpretations (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We conducted two tests to
investigate common method variance in this study. First, we used Harmon’s one-factor test3
using exploratory factor analysis to examine if one component explains more than 50 percent of
the model or a single factor emerges (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). The results show that the first
factor explains 34 percent and multiple factors appeared. We also used Lindell and Whitney’s
(2001) marker variable test using the smallest observed correlation in the dataset. The matrices
of item-to-item correlations demonstrate the marker variable has non-significant correlations
(ranging from 0.01 to 0.06) with the other five research constructs. Therefore, this study does not
suffer from common method variance.
Manipulation Check
To check the manipulation of external attack, we asked the respondents (both external
attack and internal attack groups) to what extent, based on the scenarios, they believe that the
attack came from an external source. The results [t (848) = 33.72, p < 0.001] show that the
respondents significantly perceived the difference between external attacks (M = 6.29, SD =
1.35) and internal (M = 2.14, SD = 1.97) attacks in the scenarios. For the digital attack and
physical attack manipulation, we asked the respondent to what extent they believe that the data
breach incidence in the scenarios happened by digital communications. The results [t (848) =

Despite criticisms against Harmon’s one-factor test, recent IS research still uses this method as a valid examination
of common method variance (e.g., Goode et al. 2017).
3
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31.06, p < 0.001] confirm that the participants understood the difference between digital attack
(M = 6.39, SD = 1.16) and physical attack (M = 2.56, SD = 2.10) in the scenarios. Finally, we
provided another question about the source of data breach announcement in the scenario-based
survey. The results [t (848) = 36.19, p < 0.001] indicate that the respondents correctly understood
whether the announcement of data breach in the scenarios comes from the breached company (M
= 6.31, SD = 1.35) or a third-party (M = 2.07, SD = 1.83). Thus, manipulations of different
characteristics of data breaches were successful.
Study 1 Results
To test the hypotheses and the relationships of the research model, we first created
dummy variables based on the scenarios. We first coded external attack (internal attack = 0,
external attack = 1), digital communications (physical access = 0, digital communications =1),
announcement source (breached company = 0, third-party = 1), and used the mean of multi-item
variables for further analyses. We also used age, gender, internet experience, and data breach
media exposure as the control variables of the study.
Reliability and Validity
Before testing hypotheses, we evaluated the reliability and validity of the data based on
prior recommendations (e.g., Straub et al. 2004). Table 3 shows the means, standard deviations,
and reliabilities of the measures of this study. All the values of Cronbach alpha (α) and
composite reliability (CR) exceed the recommended threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally 1978),
supporting the reliabilities of all constructs. Table 1 also shows convergent validity is supported
by all values of average variance extracted (AVE) being above the threshold of 0.50. Table 4
shows discriminant validity is supported by all inter-variable correlations being below the square
roots of the associated variables’ AVE values (Segars 1997). Factor analysis with Varimax
rotation found no cross-loading of 0.40 or above (Straub et al. 2004), as shown in Appendix E.
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Table 3. Descriptives, Reliabilities, and Average Variance Extracted
Mean
S.D.
α
C.R.
Age
32.96
10.97
N/A
N/A
Gender
.56
.49
N/A
N/A
Internet Experience
16.92
5.11
N/A
N/A
Data Breach Media Exposure
3.93
1.62
N/A
N/A
External
.49
.50
N/A
N/A
Digital
.50
.50
N/A
N/A
Sensitivity
6.33
.81
.82
.82
Severity
5.75
.96
.89
.89
Social Media Intensity Impact
5.09
1.31
.86
.87
Third-Party Source
.50
.50
N/A
N/A
Switching Behavior
5.19
1.04
.91
.92
Negative WOM
4.10
1.37
.91
.90
Note. S.D. = standard deviation; α = Cronbach alpha; C.R. = composite reliability.

AVE
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
.62
.74
.70
N/A
.73
.77

Table 4. Correlation and Square-Root of Average Variance Extracted
1. Age
2. Gender
3. Internet
Experience
4. Data Breach
Media Exposure
5. External
6. Digital
7. Sensitivity
8. Severity
9. Social Media
Intensity Impact
10. Third-Party
11. Switching
Behavior
12. Negative WOM

1
N/A
.14***

2

3

4

.54***

.05

N/A

.06

-.07*

.10**

N/A

-.04
.03
.07*
.02

-.03
.04
.07*
.04

-.00
.01
.11***
.00

-.08**

.08**

-.02

0.01

9

10

11

5

6

7

8

-.01
.02
.11***
.09**

N/A
.00
.01
.04

N/A
-.03
.00

.78
0.54**

.86

-.14***

.05

-.02

.03

.23***

.29***

.83

-.02

-.05

0.02

.00

.03

.05

.02

N/A

.10**

-.03

.26***

.28***

.20***

.10**

.85

.10**

.05

.16***

.19***

.18***

.13***

.40***

12

N/A

-.06

.01

-.03

.09**

-.07*

-.09**

.00

.06

.87

Note. Diagonal is the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE). * p < 0.05; ** p <
0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Hypotheses Testing
We used STATA 15.0 to conduct regression analysis and to estimate the relationships of
the model. We first ensured that regression assumptions are met and then ran the regression
analysis. We used the following regression model to test the hypotheses:
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Switching Behavior (Negative WOM) = β0 + β1 Age + β2 Gender + β3 Internet Experience + β4
Data Breach Media Exposure + β5 External Attack + β6 Digital Communications + β7
Information Sensitivity + β8 Data Breach Severity + β9 Third-Party Source + β10 Tweets + ℇi .

Table 5 shows the results of regression analysis and the effects of data breach
characteristics on switching behavior and negative WOM.
Table 5. Results of Regression Analysis
Variables
Controls
Age
Gender
Internet Experience
Data Breach Media Exposure
Attack Characteristics
External
Digital
Information Characteristics
Sensitivity
Severity
Announcement Characteristics
Social Media Intensity Impact
Third-Party Source
Overall R-square

Hypotheses Switching Behavior

Negative WOM

.00
.00
.00
.03

.00
-.10*
.03
.02

H1a,b
H2a,b

.20***
-.03

.26***
.05

H3a,b
H4a,b

.18**
.21***

.13*
.14*

H5a,b
H6a,b

.07*
.18**
.39

.15**
.35***
.33

Note. * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
Table 5 shows that the model has reasonable explanatory power as it explains 39 percent
and 33 percent of the variance of switching behavior and negative WOM, respectively. We found
that the variance inflation factor (VIF) was below 3, demonstrating there was no
multicollinearity. Table 5 shows different data breach characteristics have different effects on
customers. Regarding attack characteristics, while external attack increases switching behavior
(β = 0.20, p < .01) and negative WOM (β = 0.26, p < .001), digital attack does not impact
customer’s behaviors. Thus, H1a,b is supported but H2a,b is not supported. The results reveal
that information characteristics of data breaches drive customer’s behaviors. Sensitivity affects
switching behavior (β = 0.18, p < .01) and negative WOM (β = 0.13, p < .05). Thus, H3a,b is
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supported. Severity also has a positive effect on switching behavior (β = 0.21, p < .001) and
negative WOM (β = 0.14, p < .05). Hence, H4a,b is supported. Table 5 shows that data breach
announcement characteristics affect customer’s behaviors. Social media intensity impact
increases both switching behavior (β = 0.07, p < .05) and negative WOM (β = 0.15, p < .001).
Thus, H5a,b is supported. Another announcement characteristic of this study is announcement
source and we found that third-party source influences switching behavior (β = 0.18, p < .01) and
negative WOM (β = 0.35, p < .001). As a result, H6a.b is supported. Finally, while the majority
of control variables do not have an effect on dependent variables. However, gender (β = -0.10, p
< .05) affects negative WOM, which shows females become more engaged in negative WOM
after a data breach.
Study 2: Event Study
We employed an event study to examine the impact of different characteristics of data
breaches with known timestamps on subsequent stock prices (Hovav et al., 2017; Martin et al.
2017; Yayla and Hu 2011). An event study hinges on the efficient market hypothesis, which
states that a stock price at a particular point in time reflects all available information up to that
point (Fama 1998). Any change in the stock price that results from new information reflects the
present value of all expected current and future profits from that new information4 (Barua and
Mani 2018; Han et al. 2012).

4

The assumption of an event study is that announcements are exogenous. In this study, there might be a concern
about the endogeneity problem in a sense that the characteristics of data breaches (e.g., digital, external) affect the
announcements. However, we believe that endogeneity is minimized in this research due to several reasons. First,
data breach notification laws require the breached companies to notify the affected stakeholders regardless of the
characteristics of data breaches. For example, if an internal employee steals a laptop that contains protected data, the
company must announce the breach to the affected stakeholders. Second, our content analysis of announcements
shows that when third parties (e.g., journalists, FBI) announce data breaches, the announcements incorporate
different data breach characteristics and third parties do not necessarily announce specific types of data breaches.
Thus, we believe that the data breach characteristics do not affect the announcements, and endogeneity is not a
significant issue.
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Event Study Data Collection
To analyze the relationship between data breaches and stock returns, we used multiple
sources to ensure that the data collection is as exhaustive as possible. We first identified data
breaches from various sources, such as Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Databreaches.net,
PHIPrivacy.net, US Department of Health and Human Services, and websites of the state
attorney general and collected 7250 data breach events. We then removed (a) any ambiguous
breach announcements, (b) the firm was non-US, not-for-profit, or sub-division of a bigger firm,
and (c) the firm was not publicly traded. Thus, we found 496 unique events from 2005-2018 that
includes the only US publicly traded organizations. The dataset incorporates different
information about data breaches, such as the date that the data breach made public, the
explanation of the data breach event, and the type of security attack, etc.
Event study is subject to confounding events and we controlled for an array of
confounding events around -1 to +3 days5 of the data breach event day. The confounding events
include dividend declarations, contract signings, earnings information, mergers and acquisitions,
utilizing new technologies (e.g., big data, cloud computing). We dropped any observation with
confounding events, excluding 93 events. As a result, we used 403 data breach announcements
with respect to their stock market data for further analysis. Finally, we collected the stock price
of each data breach announcement from CRSP to conduct the event study.

The logic of this length period is that shareholders may have “pre-announcement” information about the security
breach and may react before the stock market closed a day before the announcement (Hovav et al. 2017).
Shareholder’s reaction may continue for several days after the data breach event (Martin et al. 2017).
5
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Estimation Method
The standard approach in event studies is to first compute stock return on or around the
date of the event under consideration by applying a market model based on the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM):

where Rit is the return in the stock price of the ith firm on day t; Rmt is the total market return on
day t; αi and βi are the intercept and the slope of the market model for firm i, respectively; ℇit is
the disturbance term.
Following the convention of event studies (e.g., Yayla and Hu 2011), we use the equalweighted market index return as the market return in our model and set the estimation period to
120 days, starting at t = -130 days and ending at t = -10 days, where t = 0 day represents the
event date. However, it is important to make a clarification on the security event date. From the
shareholders’ perspective, the meaningful event date for a firm-specific security breach is the day
when such a breach becomes public knowledge, which is not necessarily the date when the
breach actually occurred. For example, the event date for a data breach such as unauthorized
access of confidential database resulting in stolen private information is the date the breach
incident becomes publicly available through media announcements. As such, we carefully
choose the appropriate event date for each security breach incident based on the type of breach
and the context of the announcement. With the daily stock return estimated for each firm over
the window of [-130, -10] using the CAPM model, the next step is to compute the abnormal
returns, AR, for firm i at and around the event dates t = -1, t = 0 and t = 1, 2, 3 using
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The abnormal return is the difference between the actual and the expected normal return
of the stock over the event period. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of firm i on this event are
then calculated over the event period using

where t1 and t2 represent the start and end date of the time period in which abnormal returns are
cumulated. For all N firms in the sample, the average CAR can be calculated using

If the calculated CARs are significantly different from zero, then an abnormal return due
to the event is declared, indicating that there is a greater possibility than mere chance that the
change(s) of the stock price(s) of the firm(s) during this time period is (are) caused by the
underlying event(s).
Measurement
The sources that we collected data breach events have provided information about each
data breach event. For example, this information includes the type of attack, the number of
exposed records, the type of disclosed information, and the industry type of each breached
company. We use this information to code different characteristics of data breach events, as
shown in Table 6. For the announcements characteristics, we followed a different procedure. For
social media, we used the number of tweets about the data breach event as suggested by prior
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research (Rosati et al. 2019). We calculated the number of tweets6 on the data breach public
announcement day and one day after with respect to the event window (-1, 1). For the source of
public announcement, we used Privacy Rights Clearinghouse dataset. To ensure the accuracy of
the dataset, we double-checked with multiple sources to identify whether a third party or the
breached company was the first source of the announcement. For example, we used data breach
notification letters of breached companies, security blogs such as databreaches.net, and news
websites to identify who first publicly announced the data breaches.
Table 6. Coding Scheme of the Variables
Characteristics
Variables
Attack Characteristics
External
Digital
Information Characteristics
Severity
Sensitivity
Announcement Characteristics Source
Social Media

Coding and Description
External:1/ Internal: 0
Digital: 1/ Physical: 0
Total number of exposed records
Sensitive: 1/ Non-sensitive: 0
Third-party: 1/ Breached company: 0
Total number of tweets on the public
announcement day and the day after

Study 2 Results
We use Eventus® (Cowan Research, 2007) to apply event study methodology in this
research. Following prior security event studies (e.g., Hovav et al. 2017; Martin et al. 2017;
Yayla and Hu 2011), we adopted the one-factor market model with the equal-weighted market
index (Benarch and Chernobai 2017; Martin et al. 2017) to conduct the event study and estimate
CARs. We also did several post-hoc and robustness tests to examine the effect of response
strategies and time and to ensure the accuracy of the results, as discussed later. Prior research
argues that when the events that are not clustered around a specific date, Patell’s standardized
version of test statistic should be used (Benaorch and Chernobai 2017; Brown and Warner 1985).

6

Twitter was established in 2006 and, thus, we could not find the number of tweets for data breach events of 2005
(i.e., ten events, about two percent of data). Consequently, we considered the number of tweets for 2005 data breach
events as missing variables and treated them with the mean of tweets (Tsikriktsis 2005).
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Thus, we used Patell’s test because data breaches occurred in different periods of time and they
were not clustered around a specific day. In addition to the market model, we estimated CAR
with market adjusted model, Fama-French 3-factor model, and Fama-French 4-factor model7 to
provide robust results.
Table 7 shows the results of the event study estimation for the full sample size with
several different event windows and means of CARs. According to Table 7, the mean of CAR is
negative for the event windows, which confirms the negative effect of data breach
announcements on stock prices. In particular, for the one day before and after the data breach
announcements (-1, 1), the mean of CAR for all firms is -0.0046.
Table 7. Results from event analyses using the full sample
Sample
Full
Sample

Event
Windows
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)

Sample
Size
403
403
403
403

Market
Model
-0.31%**
-0.46%***
-0.35%*
-0.36%$

Market Adjusted
Model
-0.32%**
-0.43%**
-0.32%*
-0.37%$

Fama-French
3-Factor Model
-0.33%***
-0.45%***
-0.41%**
-0.48%**

Fama-French
4-Factor Model
-0.33%***
-0.45%***
-0.42%**
-0.50%**

Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
We used a linear regression model to examine the effects of attack characteristics,
information characteristics, and announcement characteristics on stock market reaction, as
suggested by prior research (McWilliams and Siegel 1997). We used CARs (-1, 1)8 as the
dependent variable and used the explanatory variables as coded in Table 1. To show the
robustness of findings, we also report the t-test results with the sub-sample analysis of dummy
variables (Table 6) as suggested by Yayla and Hu (2011).

We use Fama-French 3-factor model to account for firm value (HML – high-minus-low), and size (SMB – smallminus-big). Fama-French 4-factor model also captures momentum (WML – winners-minus-losers) as an additional
risk factor (Fama and French 2012).
8
Prior research argues that the event window of CAR as the dependent variable should be the one with the highest
value (e.g., Martin et al. 2017). In this study, we found that (-1, 1) has the highest value and we used this CAR as the
dependent variable.
7
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Table 8 shows descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables of the regression
model. We used the number of prior data breach events (data breach experience) and industry
type as the control variables. Thus, the regression model is as follows:
CAR = β0 + β1 Data Breach Experience + β2 Industry Type+ β3 External Attack + β4 Digital
Communications + β5 Information Sensitivity + β6 Data Breach Severity + β7 Third-Party Source
+ β7 Tweets + ℇi .

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variables
1. Experience
2. Industry
3. External
4. Digital
5. Sensitivity
6. Severity
7. Tweet
8. Third-Party
9. CAR

Mean
1.28
.50
.84
.69
.66
3296437
16.31
.34
.00

S.D.
2.04
.50
.36
.46
.47
2.24e
102.75
.47
.04

1
1.00
.12*
-.15**
.05
-.01
-.03
.04
.11*
.02

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.00
-.10*
.04
-.01
-.03
.03
-.01
-.07

1.00
-.28***
-.04
.06
.03
-.12**
-.10*

1.00
-.25***
.09*
.09*
.16**
-.02

1.00
-.04
.01
-.17**
-.12**

1.00
.48***
.02
-.05

1.00
.01
-.13**

1.00
-.15**

1.00

Note. * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001. Experience = data breach experience (number of
prior data breach incidents), Industry = industry type (1 if the firm is a financial firm, 0
otherwise).
Table 9 shows the results of regression analysis and the effects of different characteristics
of data breach events on the stock market (CAR). We also investigated the effect of dummy
variables (i.e., external, digital, information sensitivity, and announcement source) on the
relationship between data breach announcements and stock prices using the analysis of subsamples.
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Table 9. Regression Analysis of Data Breach Events with Different Characteristics
Variables
Controls
Data Breach Experience
Industry Type
Attack Characteristics
External
Digital
Information Characteristics
Sensitivity
Severity
Announcement Characteristics
Tweet

Hypotheses

Third-Party

Coefficients

Standardized Coefficients

.001 (.002)
-.009 (.006)

.055
-.09

H1c
H2c

-.01* (.010)
-.008 (.007)

-.12*
-.07

H3c
H4c

-.019** (.007)
5.383e (.000)

-.176**
.017

H5c
H6c

-6.483e* (.000)
-.019** (.007)

-.149*
-.175**

Fit Statistics

Overall R-square: .08

Note. * P<0.05, ** P<0.01. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. One-tailed hypothesis
tests.
Table 10 shows the results of the event study for the attacks that come from external
sources or internal employees. The results show that while data breach events with external
attacks have a negative mean CAR, the data breaches that are the results of internal attacks do
not provide a negative mean CAR. Table 9 also shows that External (β = -0.12, p < .05) has a
negative effect on the dependent variable. Thus, H1c is supported.
Table 10. Results from event analyses using the internal and external samples
Sample

Event
Windows

Sample
Size

Market
Model

Market Adjusted
Model

Fama-French
3-Factor Model

Fama-French
4-Factor Model

Internal

(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)

62
62
62
62
341
341
341
341

0.50%$
0.45%
0.30%
0.37%
-0.46%***
-0.62%***
-0.47%**
-0.50%**

0.48%*
0.50%*
0.56%$
0.59%$
-0.46%***
-0.60%***
-0.48%**
-0.54%**

0.27%
0.27%
0.18%
0.22%
-0.44%***
-0.58%***
-0.51%**
-0.61%**

0.23%
0.28%
0.29%
0.33%
-0.43%***
-0.59%***
-0.55%**
-0.66%**

External

Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
To test H2c, we compared physical and digital sub-samples. Table 11 shows the relevant
event study results of sub-samples and reveals that both physical and digital sub-samples have
negative means of CARs. We also conducted a t-test for the event window (-1, 1) with the
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market model as suggested by prior research (Yayla and Hu 2011) and the results [t (401) = .497,
p = 0.61) show that there is not a significant difference between the means of CARs. The results
of regression analysis (Table 9) also reveal that digital communications do not intensify the
negative relationship between announcements and stock market reaction. Thus, H2c is not
supported.
Table 11. Results from event analyses using physical and digital samples
Sample

Event
Windows

Sample
Size

Market
Model

Market Adjusted
Model

Fama-French
3-Factor Model

Fama-French
4-Factor Model

Physical

(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)

122
122
122
122
281
281
281
281

-0.26%*
-0.45%*
-0.43%$
-0.56%$
-0.34%**
-0.46%**
-0.31%*
-0.28%$

-0.15%$
-0.31%$
-0.33%$
-0.45%$
-0.39%**
-0.49%**
-0.32%$
-0.33%

-0.15%
-0.30%
-0.34%
-0.46%
-0.41%**
-0.52%**
-0.44%*
-0.49%*

-0.11%
-0.26%
-0.34%
-0.50%
-0.42%**
-0.54%**
-0.45%*
-0.50%*

Digital

Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
To investigate the effect of information sensitivity, we conducted an event study with the
data breach events that disclosed non-sensitive information and those that revealed sensitive
information. Table 12 shows that only those data breach events that disclosed sensitive
information have significant negative CARs. Table 9 also confirms that sensitivity (β = -0.17, p
< .01) negatively affects CAR. Thus, H3c is supported. On the other hand, severity is not
impactful and the number of disclosed records does not have an effect on CAR. Therefore, H4c
is not supported.
Table 12. Results from event analyses using the non-sensitive and sensitive samples
Sample

Event
Windows

Sample
Size

Market
Model

Market Adjusted
Model

Fama-French
3-Factor Model

Fama-French
4-Factor Model

NonSensitive

(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)

135
135
135
135
268
268
268
268

-0.11%
-0.03%
-0.02%
-0.09%
-0.41%***
-0.67%***
-0.53%**
-0.50%**

-0.19%$
-0.11%
-0.06%
-0.18%
-0.38%**
-0.60%***
-0.46%**
-0.46%*

-0.21%$
-0.14%
-0.10%
-0.19%
-0.40%**
-0.61%***
-0.56%**
-0.63%**

-0.21%$
-0.19%
-0.13%
-0.21%
-0.39%**
-0.59%***
-0.56%**
-0.65%**

Sensitive

Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
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Table 9 shows that the stock market reacts to the tweets about data breaches. A higher
number of tweets about data breaches leads to a higher negative effect on CAR. Tweets (β = 0.15, p < .05) have a negative effect on CAR and, thus, H5c is supported. We tested H6c by first
conducting event studies with sub-samples of third-party source and breached company source.
Table 13 shows that the mean of CARs is negative for both sub-samples but the results of t-test [t
(401) = 1.84, p = 0.06) show that the data breaches that are announced by a third-party have
more negative effects on CAR than when breached companies announce the events. Table 9 also
shows that source (third-party) (β = -0.17, p < .01) has a negative effect on CAR. Thus, H6c is
supported.
Table 13. Results from event analyses using third-party and breached company samples
Sample

Event
Windows

Sample
Size

Market
Model

Market Adjusted
Model

Fama-French
3-Factor Model

Fama-French
4-Factor Model

ThirdParty

(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)

138
138
138
138
265
265
265
265

-0.51%*
-0.70%***
-0.51%
-0.66%$
-0.21%**
-0.33%*
-0.26%**
-0.21%

-0.47%*
-0.60%*
-0.46%
-0.63%$
-0.24%*
-0.35%**
-0.25%*
-0.23%$

-0.46%*
-0.59%*
-0.41%
-0.54%$
-0.27%**
-0.38%**
-0.41%*
-0.45%*

-0.45%*
-0.62%*
-0.45%
-0.58%$
-0.26%**
-0.37%**
-0.40%*
-0.46%*

Breached
Company

Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
Post-hoc Analysis
We conducted several post-hoc analyses to dig more into data. We first tested interaction
effects with different attacks, disclosed information, and announcement characteristics. We
tested the interactions with both experiment and event study data. However, we did not find any
significant interaction effects on the three dependent variables of this study.
We also tested the effect of the event year in our event study analysis. To do so, we
divided the full sample into two sub-samples, each incorporates seven years. As a result, one
sub-sample constitutes events between 2005 and 2011 and the other sub-sample includes events
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between 2012 and 2018. Table 14 shows the results of the effect of the event year and indicates
that data breaches cause more negative effects in recent years.
Table 13. Results from event analyses using event years
Years

Event
Windows

Sample
Size

Market
Model

Adjusted
Returns
Model

Fama-French
3-Factor Model

Fama-French
4-Factor
Model

2005-2011

(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)

209
209
209
209
194
194
194
194

-0.12%$
-0.24%$
-0.21%
-0.30%
-0.51%***
-0.69%***
-0.49%**
-0.43%*

-0.09%
-0.17%
-0.14%
-0.27%
-0.55%***
-0.71%***
-0.52%**
-0.47%*

-0.14%$
-0.21%$
-0.27%
-0.46%$
-0.54%**
-0.71%**
-0.54%*
-0.50%*

-0.14%
-0.21%
-0.27%
-0.46%$
-0.53%**
-0.72%***
-0.57%**
-0.55%*

2012-2018

Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
Discussion
Despite significant investment in information security and upgrading security
technologies, companies face data breaches frequently. While companies need to persistently
improve their security systems, they need to identify the influential data breach characteristics. It
helps companies to allocate resources more judiciously, thereby decreasing the negative effects
of data breaches. In this study, we first did a content analysis of data breach announcements to
categorize the data breach characteristics that appeared in the announcements. Then, we adopted
the SMCC model to identify the attributes of announcements. By conducting two studies, we
examined the effect of the same data breach event and post-event characteristics on two main
stakeholders’ of a breached company: customers and shareholders. We found the characteristics
that impact both or either of customers or shareholders and the data breach attributes that are not
influential.
Table 15 shows the summary of hypotheses testing results that are derived from the two
studies. The results show that various data breach characteristics mostly have consistent effects
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on customers’ and shareholder’s behaviors. The results provide several implications for research
and practice as discussed next.
Table 15. Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results
Customer’s Behavior

Hypotheses

H1: External attacks have more effects than internal attacks
on the stakeholder’s behaviors.
H2: Digital attacks have more effects than physical attacks
on the stakeholder’s behaviors.
H3: Sensitive information has more effects than nonsensitive information on the stakeholder’s behaviors.
H4: Severity has a negative effect on the stakeholder’s
behaviors.
H5: Social media intensity has a negative effect on the
stakeholder’s behaviors.
H6: Third-party announcements have more negative effects
than breached company announcements on the stakeholder’s
behaviors.

Switching Negative
Behavior WOM
Supported Supported

Shareholder’s
Behavior
CAR
Supported

Not
Not
Supported Supported
Supported Supported

Not
Supported
Supported

Supported Supported
Supported Supported

Not
Supported
Supported

Supported Supported

Supported

Implications for Research
This research provides several implications for research based on the content analysis of
announcements, adoption of the SMCC model, and the findings of data analyses with two
studies. First, prior data breach studies suggest several different classifications of data breaches
(Hovav et al. 2007; Hovav et al. 2017; Posey et al. 2017; Yayla and Hu 2011). Information
security research also provides other categorizations of security attacks and threats (Howard
1997; Loch et al. 1992; Willison and Warkentin 2013). Although these studies enhance the
knowledge of different types of threats and data breaches, many of their provided attributes are
either technical intensive or so detailed that they are not reflected in the data breach
announcements. As the stakeholders mainly do not understand or become aware of the technical
complexity of data breaches, it is not clear if the advanced technical specifications of attacks
really affect stakeholders. Stakeholders commonly comprehend a data breach event through the
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announcements. Data breach announcements are the statements that simply describe the data
breach event so the public can understand conveniently. As most people do not understand the
difference between “DoS attack” and “unauthorized access” classifications, the announcements
avoid using the terms that require advanced IT knowledge to grasp. Identifying data breach
characteristics in the announcements is important because stakeholders behave based on these
announcements. In this study, we did a content analysis with 403 data breach announcements and
found that the announcements lump several different security attacks (classifications) into one
camp and use a more general terminology for the attacks. In particular, we found that the
announcements provide information about the source of the attack (external vs internal) and the
strategy (digital vs physical). We also found that the announcement reports what type of
information was disclosed (sensitive vs non-sensitive) and the severity of data breaches (number
of disclosed records).
Second, depending on the business model and industry type, each company has several
stakeholders that are affected by the company's major events, such as data breaches. The
negative behaviors of these stakeholders provide tremendous costs to the breached company.
However, most of the prior data breach studies have investigated either customers (e.g.,
Chakraborty et al. 2016; Choi et al. 2016; Goode et al. 2017) or shareholders (Gwebu et al. 2018;
Richardson et al. 2019; Yayla and Hu 2011) and it was not clear if a factor that affects customers
has the same effect on shareholders. By conducting two different studies to examine the effects
of data breach characteristics on customers and shareholders, we found that the data breach
characteristics that appear in the announcements might have different effects on customers and
shareholders. In particular, we found that the importance of data breach severity (i.e., the total
number of revealed records) for customers and shareholders is different.
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While data breach severity affects customer’s behaviors by increasing switching behavior
and negative WOM, it does not have a significant effect on the shareholder’s behavior in the
stock market. Even though some prior event studies find the significant effects of severity on
CAR (e.g., Martin et al. 2017), others find that severity does not affect stock market reaction to
data breaches (e.g., Malhotra and Malhotra 2011). These mixed findings suggest more
investigations about the impact of data breach severity and the factors that influence the
significance of severity effect. For example, Gwebu et al. (2018) find that the reputation of a
firm affects data breach severity effect on CAR and when a high reputation firm faces a data
breach, the severity does not affect CAR. However, these event studies do not examine data
breach severity with other characteristics of a data breach in the same nomological network and
do not study whether other characteristics are more influential than severity on CAR. In contrast
to shareholders, customers deem data breach severity a significant attribute in their decisions to
switch to another company and spread negative words about the breached company. When
customers recognize a high number of records was disclosed, they estimate a higher likelihood
that their information is among disclosed records. For customers, a high number of disclosed
records demonstrates the inability of the company to protect customers’ information.
Prior information security research signifies internal attacks and discusses that “insider
threat” can damage company information security and obtain important data in the same level of
external attacks if not more. Hence, the relevant studies recommend managers designing
appropriate security measures for internal attacks (e.g., Posey et al. 2011; Warkentin and
Willison 2009; Willison and Warkentin 2013). While we acknowledge the importance of internal
threats, we did not find these attacks are as impactful as external threats in a data breach
aftermath. We found that only external threats affect customer’s and shareholder’s behaviors and
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these stakeholders show more negative behaviors when an attack from outside results in the data
breach. As outsiders have limited access and knowledge about the company (Willison and
Warkentin 2013) comparing to insiders, a successful security attack from outside of the company
represents the company's poor security practices and management. Customers and shareholders
might believe that when an outsider can penetrate the security systems of a company, insiders are
also able to access company confidential information without any major obstacle.
Another attribute of a data breach relates to the strategy that attackers adopt to access
company information. Attackers employ a strategy based on an opportunity or a weakness that
they find in the company information security. As a company information system incorporates
several layers of data transition (i.e., apps, software, OS, network), there is a myriad of tools and
technologies that use digital communications to gain unauthorized access to information.
However, company information can also be obtained through stealing portable devices (e.g.,
laptop, PDA) as well as physical documents. While penetrating in the company network provides
access to a larger scope of information than looting physical devices, we did not find any of these
strategies affect the stakeholders’ behaviors. We found that digital and physical attacks do not
differentially affect the stock market reaction and do not influence the customer’s switching
behavior and negative WOM. However, we found that customers and shareholders react
negatively when they realize that sensitive information is disclosed by the data breach. Event
study results show that data breaches have significant negative effects only when they
compromise sensitive information. Prior behavioral security and privacy research has found that
disclosing sensitive information increases risk perception (e.g., Bansal and Gefen 2010; Malhotra
et al. 2004), we examined the effect of information sensitivity on individuals’ behaviors after a
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data breach in this research. The experiment results show that sensitive information disclosure
increases the likelihood of switching behavior and negative WOM.
This study is the first that investigates data breach post-event characteristics on the
stakeholders. Prior crisis management research acknowledges the importance of communication
form and source (Austin et al. 2012; Jin and Liu 2010), but the effects of attributes after a data
breach were unknown. Thus, we adopted the SMCC model to examine the effect of data breach
announcements form and source after a data breach event. The experiment and event study
results show that the saturation of a data breach discussion in social media exacerbates the
stakeholders’ negative behaviors. These findings suggest that social media is powerful mass
media and as an environmental factor (Bandura 2001) socially affects switching behavior,
negative WOM, and the stock market. The fact that social media intensity affects negative WOM
possibly shows the snowball effect of social media discussion and, for example, the number of
tweets about a data breach swiftly grows as more tweets are posted. Finally, this study examines
the announcement source and finds the value of the first announcer of a data breach. Prior study
finds that both the company and third-party sources can be effective after a crisis (Liu et al.
2011). However, we found that in the data breach context, a third-party announcement has a
more negative effect than the breached company announcement. The experiment and the event
study results unanimously show that when customers and shareholders realize a data breach a
third-party announcement, they reciprocate to the data breach event more. The fact that a thirdparty announces a data breach in lieu of the breached company provides several possible
interpretations. First, the breached is still unaware of the data breach that shows the company
was incapable of detecting the attack. Second, the breached company decided to remain silent
and attempted to hide data breach that demonstrates the dishonesty of the company. Thus, due to
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the probable incapability and dishonesty of the breached company, the stakeholders retaliate by
taking private and public actions.
Implications for Practice
This study digs into various parts of data breach announcements to identify and examine
data breach characteristics. The findings provide several implications that assist managers to
better design the information security strategic plan. First, although companies create security
measures to protect company information against internal and external threats. This study finds
that external attacks provide more negative effects and, thus, the manager should allocate more
resources to keep the boundary of IS safe. We suggest that managers focus more on designing
the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and installing intrusion detection systems (IDS) and prevention
systems (IPS) to defend external attacks. However, protecting physical assets especially those
that possess company information should not be neglected because we find that physical and
digital attacks are equally important. Many company laptops and mobile devices are stolen from
employees’ vehicles and homes. Therefore, chief information officers (CIOs) and chief security
officers (CSOs) should train their employees to know how cautiously protect physical assets not
only inside the company but also outside. As disclosing sensitive information and a higher
number of records have more negative impacts on stakeholders, we recommend that the relevant
servers be located in a separate network with proper security systems in front (e.g., anti-malware
system, firewall, IDS, IPS). It helps if the main network is hacked, there would be an additional
layer to reach confidential information.
In addition to protecting against security attacks, the companies should be proactive and
create a data breach response plan. Investing in information security minimizes the likelihood of
a hack but it does not eliminate it. Hence, the companies should have a response plan to know
what to do and how respond to a data breach to mitigate the negative consequences of a data
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breach. To this end, companies should be the first announcer of the data breach because this
study found that if a third-party announces the data breach, the negative outcomes enhance. We
recommend that the breached companies announce their data breaches via social media as this
study found social media affect both customers and shareholders. Breached companies can
include the guidelines to affected people, their response (e.g., apology, compensation), and how
the company handles the data breach event in their announcement. These companies should
make announcements with their social media pages (e.g., Twitter, Facebook) to vastly reach out
and positively affect the stakeholders.
Limitations and Future Research
We acknowledge several limitations of this study that provide new opportunities for
future research. First, although we examined the effects of various data breach characteristics
that appear in the data breach announcements, we did not investigate other pieces of information
included in the announcements. For example, companies adopt different response strategies after
a data breach and they provide different responses, such as apology and compensation. Future
research can examine the efficacy of these response strategies along with the data breach
characteristics. Second, we only examined customers and shareholders as the main stakeholders
of a company in this study but companies have other stakeholders (e.g., distributors, insurance
companies, suppliers). Future research can examine if a data breach affects other stakeholders of
a company and whether various data breach characteristics differentially attack the stakeholders.
Third, even though prior research considers social media as a salient information form,
traditional media (e.g., TV, Radio, newspapers) and WOM are other information forms that we
did not examine in our event study. Thus, future research can examine if other information forms
influence the stock market and if so, which form is more impactful. Finally, this study was
conducted in the USA and the participants were customers of American companies and,
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therefore, the study is constrained to a particular cultural and sociopolitical context. Future
research can investigate a data breach and announcements characteristics in other geographical
locations and examine the effect of such characteristics on local customers. Future research can
also examine data breach event and post-event characteristics in the stock markets of other
geographical locations.
Conclusions
Companies substantially invest in information security to protect their information
against security attacks and unauthorized access. Despite this significant attention and
investment, data breaches occur frequently and many companies cannot escape from these
incidents, facing tangible and intangible losses. If the companies understand what aspects of data
breaches are more effective, they can shrewdly improve those areas to minimize the negative
consequences of a data breach. In this research, we first identified the data breach characteristics
that are included in the data breach announcements by doing a content analysis of 403 data
breach announcements. We also used the SMCC model to investigate the roles of the
announcement source and form after a data breach. We examined the effects of these attributes
on customer’s and shareholder’s behaviors by conducting two studies: an online experiment and
an event study.
We found that data breach characteristics, based on announcements, can be categorized
into attack characteristics and disclosed information characteristics. We found that while external
attacks affect customers and shareholders, internal attacks are not influential. Digital attacks do
not affect customers and shareholders more than physical attacks. Disclosing sensitive
information arouses the stakeholders’ negative behaviors and severity has different effects on the
stakeholders— while it hurts customers, it does not influence shareholders. This study found the
significant effect of announcement characteristics namely information form and source. Social
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media plays a key role after a data breach and both customers and shareholders are influenced by
social media intensity. Finally, we found that announcing a data breach by a third-party creates
more negative consequences than the breached company.

55

Essay 1 References
Austin, L., Fisher Liu, B., & Jin, Y. (2012). How audiences seek out crisis information:
Exploring the social-mediated crisis communication model. Journal of Applied Communication
Research, 40(2), 188-207.
Bandura, A. (2009). Social cognitive theory of mass communication. In Media Effects (pp. 110140). Routledge.
Bansal, G., & Gefen, D. (2010). The impact of personal dispositions on information sensitivity,
privacy concern and trust in disclosing health information online. Decision support systems,
49(2), 138-150.
Bansal, G., & Zahedi, F. M. (2015). Trust violation and repair: The information privacy
perspective. Decision Support Systems, 71, 62-77.
Bansal, G., Zahedi, F. M., & Gefen, D. (2010). The impact of personal dispositions on
information sensitivity, privacy concern and trust in disclosing health information online.
Decision Support Systems, 49(2), 138-150.
Barua, A., & Mani, D. (2018). Reexamining the market value of information technology events.
Information Systems Research, 29(1), 225-240.
Benaroch, M., & Chernobai, A. (2017). Operational IT failures, IT value-destruction, and boardlevel IT governance changes. MIS Quarterly, Forthcoming.
Boss, S., Galletta, D., Lowry, P. B., Moody, G. D., & Polak, P. (2015). What do systems users
have to fear? Using fear appeals to engender threats and fear that motivate protective security
behaviors. MIS Quarterly, 39(4), 837-864.
Brown, S., & Warner, J. (1985). Using daily stock returns: the case of event studies. Journal of
Financial Economics, 14(1), 3-31.
Bucher, H. J. (2002). Crisis communication and the Internet: Risk and trust in a global media.
First Monday, 7(4).
Chakraborty, R., Lee, J., Bagchi-Sen, S., Upadhyaya, S., & Rao, H. R. (2016). Online shopping
intention in the context of data breach in online retail stores: An examination of older and
younger adults. Decision Support Systems, 83, 47-56.
Chen, Y., & Zahedi, F. M. (2016). Individuals’ internet security perceptions and behaviors:
Polycontextual contrasts between the United States and China. MIS Quarterly, 40(1), 205-222.
Choi, B. C., Kim, S. S., & Jiang, Z. (2016). Influence of firm’s recovery endeavors upon privacy
breach on online customer behavior. Journal of Management Information Systems, 33(3), 904933.

56

Choi, B. C., Kim, S. S., & Jiang, Z. (2016). Influence of firm’s recovery endeavors upon privacy
breach on online customer behavior. Journal of Management Information Systems, 33(3), 904933.
Chung, M. (2019). The message influences me more than others: How and why social media
metrics affect first person perception and behavioral intentions. Computers in Human Behavior,
91, 271-278.
Corrado, C. J. (1989). A nonparametric test for abnormal security-price performance in event
studies. Journal of financial economics, 23(2), 385-395.
Cowan Research, LC. (2007). Eventus® (Version 9): Software for Event Studies and CRSP Data
Retrieval/ User’s Guide, Cowan Research, Ames, IA (http://www.eventstudy.com).
Databreaches.net News. (2011). Retrieved from https://www.databreaches.net/news.
Deagon, B. (2018). Facebook stock troubles didn’t start with data scandal. Retrieved from
https://www.investors.com/news/technology/facebook-stock-sell-signals-cambridge-analyticadata-scandal.
Fama, E. F. (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of
financial economics, 49(3), 283-306.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2012). Size, value, and momentum in international stock returns.
Journal of financial economics, 105(3), 457-472.
Gay, S. (2017). Strategic news bundling and privacy breach disclosures. Journal of
Cybersecurity, 3(2), 91-108.
Giaccotto, C., & Sfiridis, J. M. (1996). Hypothesis testing in event studies: The case of variance
changes. Journal of Economics and Business, 48(4), 349-370.
Goel, S., & Shawky, H. A. (2009). Estimating the market impact of security breach
announcements on firm values. Information & Management, 46(7), 404-410.
Goode, S., Hoehle, H., Venkatesh, V., & Brown, S. A. (2017). User compensation as a data
breach recovery action: An investigation of the Sony PlayStation Network breach. MIS
Quarterly, 41(3), 703-727.
Gwebu, K. L., Wang, J., & Wang, L. (2018). The role of corporate reputation and crisis response
strategies in data breach management. Journal of Management Information Systems, 35(2), 683714.
Han, K., Oh, W., Im, K. S., Chang, R. M., Oh, H., & Pinsonneault, A. (2012). Value cocreation
and wealth spillover in open innovation alliances. MIS Quarterly, 36(1), 291-315.
Han, W., Ada, S., Sharman, R., & Rao, H. R. (2015). Campus emergency notification systems:
An examination of factors affecting compliance with alerts. MIS Quarterly, 39(4), 909-930.

57

Hinz, O., Nofer, M., Schiereck, D., & Trillig, J. (2015). The influence of data theft on the share
prices and systematic risk of consumer electronics companies. Information & Management,
52(3), 337-347.
Hovav, A., & Andoh-Baidoo, F. K., & Dhillion, G. (2007). Classification of security breaches
and their impact on the market value of firms. In Proceedings of the 6th Annual Security
Conference.
Hovav, A., Han, J., & Kim, J. (2017). Market reaction to security breach announcements:
Evidence from South Korea. ACM SIGMIS Database: the DATABASE for Advances in
Information Systems, 48(1), 11-52.
Hovav, A., Han, J., & Kim, J. (2017). Market reaction to security breach announcements:
Evidence from South Korea. ACM SIGMIS Database: the DATABASE for Advances in
Information Systems, 48(1), 11-52.
Howard, J. D. (1997). An analysis of security incidents on the Internet 1989-1995. CarnegieMellon Univ Pittsburgh PA.
IBM, (2018). 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study: Global overview. Retrieved from
https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/861MNWN2
Janakiraman, R., Lim, J. H., & Rishika, R. (2018). The effect of a data breach announcement on
customer behavior: Evidence from a multichannel retailer. Journal of Marketing, 82(2), 85-105.
Liu, B. F., Austin, L., & Jin, Y. (2011). How publics respond to crisis communication strategies:
The interplay of information form and source. Public Relations Review, 37(4), 345-353.
Loch, K. D., Carr, H. H., & Warkentin, M. E. (1992). Threats to information systems: today's
reality, yesterday's understanding. MIS Quarterly, 16(2), 173-186.
Malhotra, A., & Kubowicz Malhotra, C. (2011). Evaluating customer information breaches as
service failures: An event study approach. Journal of Service Research, 14(1), 44-59.
Malhotra, N. K., Kim, S. S., & Agarwal, J. (2004). Internet users' information privacy concerns
(IUIPC): The construct, the scale, and a causal model. Information systems research, 15(4), 336355.
Martin, K. D., Borah, A., & Palmatier, R. W. (2017). Data privacy: Effects on customer and firm
performance. Journal of Marketing, 81(1), 36-58.
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (1997). Event studies in management research: Theoretical and
empirical issues. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 626-657.
Milne, G. R., & Gordon, M. E. (1993). Direct mail privacy-efficiency trade-offs within an
implied social contract framework. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 12(2), 206-215.
Murphy, R. (2019). What is the cost of a data breach? Retrieved from
https://www.blackstratus.com/what-is-the-cost-of-a-data-breach/
58

New York Times. (2019). Facebook security breach exposes accounts of 50 million users.
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/technology/facebook-hack-databreach.html.
Nowak, G. J., & Phelps, J. E. (1992). Understanding privacy concerns: an assessment of
consumers’ information-related knowledge and beliefs. Journal of Direct Marketing, 6(4), 28-39.
Nunnally, J. C. 1978. Psychometric Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Posey, C., Bennett, R. J., & Roberts, T. L. (2011). Understanding the mindset of the abusive
insider: An examination of insiders’ causal reasoning following internal security changes.
Computers & Security, 30(6-7), 486-497.
Posey, C., Raja, U., Crossler, R. E., & Burns, A. J. (2017). Taking stock of organisations’
protection of privacy: Categorising and assessing threats to personally identifiable information in
the USA. European Journal of Information Systems, 26(6), 585-604.
Procopio, C. H., & Procopio, S. T. (2007). Do you know what it means to miss New Orleans?
Internet communication, geographic community, and social capital in crisis. Journal of Applied
Communication Research, 35(1), 67-87.
Richardson, V., Watson, M. W., & Smith, R. E. (2019). Much Ado about Nothing: The (Lack of)
Economic Impact of Data Privacy Breaches. Journal of Information Systems.
Rosati, P., Deeney, P., Cummins, M., Van der Werff, L., & Lynn, T. (2019). Social media and
stock price reaction to data breach announcements: Evidence from US listed companies.
Research in International Business and Finance, 47, 458-469.
Sanders, J. (2019). Data breaches increased 54% in 2019 so far. Retrieved from
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/data-breaches-increased-54-in-2019-so-far.
Segars, A. H. (1997). Assessing the unidimensionality of measurement: A paradigm and
illustration within the context of information systems research. Omega, 25(1), 107-121.
Sheehan, K. B., & Hoy, M. G. (2000). Dimensions of privacy concern among online consumers.
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 62-73.
Statistia. (2019). Spending on cybersecurity in the United States from 2010 to 2018. Retrieved
from https://www.statista.com/statistics/615450/cybersecurity-spending-in-the-us.
Straub, D., Boudreau, M., and Gefen, D. (2004). Validation guidelines for IS positivist research.
The Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 13(1), 380-427.
Sutton, J., Palen, L., & Shklovski, I. (2008). Backchannels on the front lines: Emergent uses of
social media in the 2007 southern California wildfires. In F. Fiedrich & B. Van de Walle (Eds.),
Proceedings of the 5th International ISCRAM Conference, Washington, DC.
Temin, D. (2015). You have 15 minutes to respond to a crisis: A checklist of dos and don’ts.
Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviatemin/2015/08/06/you-have-15-minutes-torespond-to-a-crisis-a-checklist-of-dos-and-donts/#5eb14e4e50a8.
59

Tsikriktsis, N. (2005). A review of techniques for treating missing data in OM survey research.
Journal of operations management, 24(1), 53-62.
Vijayan, J. (2018). Uber’s response to 2016 data breach was ‘legally reprehensible,’ lawmaker
says. Retrieved from https://www.darkreading.com/informationweek-home/ubers-response-to2016-data-breach-was-legally-reprehensible-lawmaker-says/d/d-id/1330997.
Warkentin, M., & Willison, R. (2009). Behavioral and policy issues in information systems
security: the insider threat. European Journal of Information Systems, 18(2), 101-105.
Willison, R., & Warkentin, M. (2013). Beyond deterrence: An expanded view of employee
computer abuse. MIS Quarterly, 37(1), 1-20.
Yayla, A. A., & Hu, Q. (2011). The impact of information security events on the stock value of
firms: The effect of contingency factors. Journal of Information Technology, 26(1), 60-77.

60

Essay 1 Appendices
Appendix A— An Illustrative Data Breach Announcement
Target a massive data breach incident in 2013. On December 18, 2013, CNN9 along with
Target announced unauthorized access to payment card data as below.
A breach of credit and debit card data at discount retailer Target may have affected as
many as 40 million shoppers who went to the store in the three weeks after Thanksgiving, the
retailer said Thursday. Target (TGT), the nation's No. 2 general merchandise retailer after WalMart Stores (WMT), said cards used at the brick-and-mortar stores between Nov. 27 and Dec.
15, 2013, may have been impacted. Target didn't specify how its systems were hacked. But
judging by the scope of the breach and the kind of information criminals got, security experts say
hackers targeted the retailer's point-of-sale system. That means they either slipped malware into
the terminals where customers swipe their credit cards, or they collected customer data while it
was on route from Target to its credit card processors.
Table A1 shows how we coded data breach characteristics that appeared in the Target
data breach announcement.
Table A1. Coding data breach characteristics based on the announcement
Data Breach Characteristic
Statement in the announcement
Attack Source
External
Hackers targeted the retailer's point-of-sale
system.
Attack Strategy
Digital
Hackers either slipped malware into the
terminals or collected customer data while it
was on route from Target to its credit card
processors.
Information Sensitivity
Sensitive
A breach of credit and debit card data…
Number of Records
40,000,000
A breach of credit and debit card data at
discount retailer Target may have affected as
many as 40 million shoppers.

9

https://money.cnn.com/2013/12/18/news/companies/target-credit-card/index.html

61

Appendix B— An Illustrative Scenario Description
Please provide the name of one online company that you are a customer of and you need
personal information to purchase products or get services from.

Please consider this situation:
Now imagine you have just realized that the company you mentioned above has faced a major
data breach. You have found out that your information was disclosed due to the data breach.
.
.
According to the news, an external hacker through digital communications hacked servers. The
breached company itself first discovered this data breach and announced it to the public.
Please answer the rest of the questions based on this event.
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Appendix C— Measurement Items
Constructs
Severity

Sensitivity

Social Media
Intensity Impact

Switching
Behavior

Negative WOM

Data Breach
Media Exposure

Measurement
When it comes to the potential harm by the data breach of this
company (mentioned at the beginning of this survey) and a high
number of revealed customer accounts, to what extent do you agree
with these statements?
1. The consequences of this data breach with a high number of
disclosed records for me are severe.
2. The consequences of this data breach with a high number of
disclosed records for me are serious.
3. In general, the severity of this data breach with a high number of
disclosed records for me is high.
After the data breach, you realized that your information (social
security number, credit card information, and name) was disclosed.
To what extent do you agree with these statements?
1. I believe that the disclosed information is highly sensitive to me.
2. I believe that the disclosed information is highly private to me.
3. Overall, I believe that the disclosed information is confidential to
me.
After the data breach event, you noticed that there are a high number
of posts on social media discussing the data breach news. Please
answer the following statements about the influence of social media
coverage of data breach.
1. A high number of data breach news posts in social media makes
me more concerned about the data breach event.
2. A high number of data breach news posts in social media makes
me take data breaches more seriously.
3. A high number of data breach news posts in social media has an
influence on me.
To what extent do you agree with the following statements if
another company offers you the same products/services:
1. I will look for an alternative online store for better service.
2. I will think about switching to an alternative online store.
3. I will consider another online store as my major service provider.
After the data breach event, I would likely:
1. Spread the negative word of mouth about the company.
2. Bad-mouth the company to my friends, relatives, or
acquaintances.
3. Tell others not to choose them if asked about their
products/services.
How much have you heard or read during the last year about data
breaches and their consequences?

Reference
Chen and Zahedi 2016

Bansal et al. 2010

Chung 2019

Choi et al. 2016

Martin et al. 2017

Malhotra et al. 2004

Note. All items are based on 7-point scales. The items are from strongly disagree (1) to strongly
agree (7).
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Appendix D— Demographics of Primary Study Participants
Demographic Variable Category
Gender
Female
Male
Age
18-24
25-29
30-34
35-44
45- 54
55-65
Over 65
Marriage
Divorced
Married
Single
Widowed
Internet Experience
Below 10
10-15
16-20
Over 20
Income
Below $20,000
$20,000—$39,999
$40,000—$69,999
$70,000—$99,999
$100,000 and over
Education
High school or some college
Bachelor
Master
Doctorate
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Frequency (Percentage)
371 (43.70)
478 (56.30)
209 (24.62)
178 (20.96)
155 (18.26)
172 (20.27)
91 (10.72)
36 (4.25)
8 (0.95)
33 (3.89)
319 (37.57)
489 (57.60)
8 (0.94)
38 (4.48)
337 (39.69)
320 (37.69)
154 (18.13)
171 (20.14)
238 (28.03)
237 (27.92)
122 (14.37)
81 (9.54)
388 (45.70)
327 (38.52)
116 (13.66)
18 (2.12)

Appendix E— Factor Analysis
Variable
wom1
wom2
wom3
swb1
swb2
swb3
sev1
sev2
sev3
soc1
soc2
soc3
is1
is2
is3

Factor 1
0.88
0.87
0.77
0.17
0.19
0.23
0.07
0.10
0.05
0.07
0.10
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.08

Factor 2
0.16
0.17
0.25
0.87
0.82
0.80
0.11
0.09
0.13
0.11
0.04
0.07
0.11
0.12
0.09

Factor 3
0.08
0.05
0.07
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.76
0.76
0.82
0.07
0.10
0.17
0.27
0.31
0.19

Factor 4
0.06
0.07
0.12
0.07
0.08
0.10
0.13
0.12
0.16
0.79
0.82
0.75
0.13
0.10
0.07
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Factor 5
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.14
0.10
0.11
0.27
0.31
0.27
0.06
0.08
0.13
0.72
0.75
0.63

Essay2: An Empirical Investigation of Company Response to Data Breaches
Introduction
U.S. organizations’ investment in cybersecurity, to protect their business data from
malicious information disclosure, is growing every year. According to the White House, U.S.
private sector spending on cybersecurity increased 8.7 percent in 2019 to $124 billion and the
government spent $16.6 billion in the same fiscal year (Ratnam 2019). Despite the considerable
investment in cybersecurity, data breaches at U.S. businesses and government agencies have
grown exponentially. In the first six months of 2019, the number of exposed records in the U.S.
reached 3.2 billion records and 3800 data breaches happened— a 50% or greater increase over
the last four years (Sanders 2019). The consequences of data breaches are severe for the
organization as they lose reputation and revenue (Brooks 2018). For instance, Equifax estimated
to pay $650 million to settle the claims from its 2017 data breach that disclosed sensitive
information of 147 million customers (New York Times 2019). Breached companies are also in
peril of losing customers when a data breach occurs. A recent report shows that 70% of
customers stop using a business after a data breach incident (Urrico 2017). Customers also tend
to switch to another company and spread negative words about the breached company (Choi et
al. 2016; Martin et al. 2017).
To alleviate the negative consequences of data breaches and repair the damaged
relationship with customers, many companies create a response plan for these events. In fact,
security experts acknowledge the importance of a sophisticated timely response in a data breach
aftermath that helps the companies to replenish the loss caused by the data breach (Hamilton
2019; Zurier 2018). Research also acknowledges the effectiveness of company response to
decreasing negative reactions to crisis events including data breaches (Goode et al. 2017; Mansor
and Kader Ali 2017; Tsarenko and Tojib 2015). Although many companies recognize the
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importance of a response to data breaches, their responses vary. For example, in response to its
data breach event in 2015, Nvidia only provided protective recommendations to customers in its
data breach notification letter. Boeing, following another strategy, apologized and compensated
the affected customers, in addition to the protective recommendations in its data breach response
in 2017. Notwithstanding various responses to data breach events, the efficacy of these different
responses to decrease negative outcomes of a data breach is still unknown. Consequently, the
first research objective of this study is to investigate the variety of response strategies adopted by
breached companies and their effectiveness on customers of the breached company. Evaluating
outcomes of various response strategies is important to companies so they employ the response
strategies that have the best effect on customers. Such work also contributes to research in crisis
response management research to understand the strategies adopted in a data breach crisis.
Another facet of data breach response that companies should deal with after an incident is
the laws and regulations that the government has imposed on the breached companies. Data
breach notification laws were established in 2002 to require the breached companies to notify
their affected customers about the breach. While some states demand an immediate response
after the breach (e.g., California and Illinois), others allow the notifications to be sent after 30 to
45 days of the data breach event (e.g., Florida and Ohio). Aside from the legal notification time
frame, security experts emphasize the importance of response time and recommend announcing a
data breach response in the shortest possible time (Hawthorn 2016; Matteson 2017). However,
prior research does not study whether the data breach response time can impact the effectiveness
of response strategies. If the response time influences the potency of the response strategies, the
breached companies should make greater effort to expedite the delivery of the breach response.
If not, they do not need to allocate more resources in the acute situation of data breach aftermath
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and implement their response strategy within the legal period. Thus, the second research
objective of this research is examining the effect of response time on various response strategies.
In structuring this paper, we first review crisis response strategies and data breach
consequence and response research to understand the key findings of this area. Then, we present
the findings of content analysis to discuss the response strategies that the breached companies
have adopted. We use expectation violation theory (EVT) to understand the fact that data
breaches violate customers’ expectations and provoke negative emotions and behaviors. A
research model based on the EVT theory is presented to examine whether response strategies
adopted by breached companies can decrease customers’ negative public and private reactions
and whether the effect of such strategies depends on time. Subsequently, the results of
hypotheses testing using a factorial survey (n = 811) with 15 different conditions of response
strategies and time are presented. This is followed by a discussion of implications for research
and practice.
Background and Theoretical Foundations
In this section, we review crisis response strategies and data breaches research to discuss
the major organizational responses to crises and what related studies are conducted in the data
breach context. We then conduct a content analysis to determine the specific responses that are
salient in the data breach crisis context. Finally, we describe the expectancy violation theory as
the basis of the overall framing of our research model.
Crisis Response Strategies
A crisis is often a fundamental threat to the stability of an organization and conveys risk
to significant aspects of an organization including organizational image, legitimacy, profitability,
and ultimately survival (Ulmer and Sellnow 2002). Therefore, crisis management becomes vital
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for any organization to maintain its stability and keep the current position in the market after a
crisis. Prior research argues that crisis management uses different rhetorical, impression
management, and account-giving concepts to acquire an appropriate response to protect
organization image during and after crisis (Allen and Caillouet 1994; Benoit 1995; Cailiouet and
Allen 1996; Coombs 1995; 1998). As part of crisis management, organizations that face a crisis
should respond to it quickly as stakeholders and the media demand immediate, thorough, and
qualified responses from the organization (Hegner et al. 2016). Crisis management research
emphasizes that crisis almost always provoke a bad impression of the focal organization and
causes its stakeholders to engage in negative behaviors. For instance, prior research argues that
crisis can cause customers to be unhappy and spread negative word-of-mouth (WOM) about the
organization and its products and, thus, keep potential new customers away from the
organization (Wangenheim 2005). This is facilitated today by the expansive use of social media
technologies. However, crisis management studies argue that when an appropriate strategy is
adopted after the crisis, the negative outcomes of crisis are considerably decreased.
Response strategies are the symbolic resources that help the organizations to protect or
repair the organizational image after a crisis (Coombs 1998). Crisis management research
enumerates several response strategies with different characteristics that aid the organizations
during and after the crisis. These responses based on their characteristics are classified into
defensive strategies, moderate strategies, and accommodative strategies (Coombs 1998; Gwebu
et al. 2018). Defensive strategies focus on the denial of the crisis or the responsibilities for the
crisis and include (a) attack the accuser: the organization confronts the person or group who
claims that a crisis exists; (b) denial: the organization states that no crisis exists and explains why
the organization has not encountered a crisis; (c) excuse: the organization attempts to minimize
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the organization’s responsibility for the crisis by denying any intention to do harm or claiming
the crisis was not the organization’s fault. Moderate strategies minimize the perceived severity of
the crisis instead of influencing the attribution of responsibilities and incorporate (a) justification:
the organization claims that there was no serious damage to minimize the perceived damage
associated with the crisis; (b) ingratiation: the organization takes actions to make stakeholders
like the organization. Accommodative strategies accept responsibility and seek to remedy the
situation. These strategies are (a) corrective action: the organization tries to repair the damage
from the crisis or take steps to prevent a repeat of the crisis; (b) apology: the organization clearly
apologize for the occurrence of the crisis and some monetary and non-monetary compensations
might include in the apology. Such response strategies can play a key role to keep the
stakeholders’ interest in the organization in the aftermath of a crisis. For example, Chang et al.
(2015) find that if managers adopt an accommodative strategy, they can improve customer
perceptions of organizational reputation, thereby reducing their engagement in negative WOM.
Data Breach Consequences and Response
Prior research investigates two facets of data breaches, namely consequences and
responses. Researchers have investigated these two facets from financial and non-financial
perspectives. Table 1 shows these categories and the main findings of each category.
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Table 1. Data Breach Research and Findings
Financial Effect
Consequences Data breach incidents cause a
negative stock market reaction and
decrease the stock price of the
breached company (Martin et al.
2017; Rosati et al. 2019; Yayla and
Hu 2011).
Responses
Appropriate response strategies can
mitigate the negative financial
impact of a data breach on the
breached company (Gwebu et al.
2018).

Non-financial Effect
After a data breach, customers show
negative behaviors, such as switching
behavior and negative word of mouth
(Choi et al. 2016; Janakiraman et al.
2018; Martin et al. 2017).
Response strategies under certain
circumstances can decrease
customers’ negative behaviors
(Bansal and Zahedi 2015; Goode et al.
2017).

The studies that investigate the consequences of data breaches have found that data
breach events negatively influence customers. According to these studies, when customers
realize that their sensitive information is relieved by data breach incidents, they take negative
actions to the breached companies. For example, Choi et al. (2016) find that two behavioral
outcomes after a data breach are switching to another company and spreading negative words
about the breached company and that perceived breached and feelings of violation enhance these
two outcomes. Martin et al. (2017) also find that negative (WOM) and switching behavior are
the customer behaviors after a data breach event and emotional violation and cognitive trust are
the determinants of these two behaviors.
The studies about the effect of response strategies are sparse and a few studies have
examined the impact of response strategies on customers’ behaviors. Bansal and Zahedi (2015)
examine trust violation and repair after a data breach and found that the effect of response
strategies is contingent upon the type of data breaches that result from hacking and unauthorized
sharing. Goode et al. (2017) study the Sony PlayStation Network data breach and find that
providing compensation to the affected customers can be effective only under certain conditions

71

such as when the expectation of compensation is small and within the perceived zone of
customers’ tolerance.
Although some data breach research discusses the importance of response strategies, the
repertoire of strategies examined is limited. Further, it is unknown what specific strategy or
combination of strategies have been adopted by breached companies and their effectiveness is
not clear. These studies have not considered the role of time and whether response time based on
data breach notification laws can moderate the effect of response strategies. Thus, in order to
accurately represent strategies used in practice, we compiled and analyzed official data breach
response letters from breached companies.
Content Analysis of Data Breach Response Letters
To better understand what response strategies have been adopted by organizations after
facing data breaches, we investigated 100 publicly traded organizations that faced data breaches.
We found that of these, ten organizations adopted “No Action” strategy. No action strategy refers
to the organization's attempts to avoid crisis problems by remaining silent and not officially
respond to crises (Chang et al. 2015). We then collected 90 official response letters from the
remaining companies that did respond after their breach. These response letters are from the
publicly traded companies that faced data breach incidents from 2013-2018. We downloaded
these official letters from various sources, such as the breached organization website and state
attorney general websites, news websites, and security blogs. Afterward, we read each response
letter rigorously and analyzed the content of these response letters to find adopted strategies
(Appendix A shows an illustrative letter). We then coded the adopted strategies as shown in
Table 1. We found that although prior research in crisis response management and specifically in
data breach context argues several defensive, moderate, and accommodative strategies (e.g.,
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Bansal and Zahedi 2015; Coombs 1998; Gwebu et al. 2018), organizations only provided
accommodative response strategies after data breach events. Further, we also found that despite
the fact that compensation is included in apology response type in the classification of response
strategies (Coombs 1998), some breached organizations offered compensation in response letters
without apologizing to the affected customers. As a result, we separate apology and
compensation as two different response strategies in this study.
Table 2 shows the response strategies in the data breach response letters, the number of
letters that include any of the response strategies, and the statement example of these strategies.
As you can see in Table 2, while some breached organizations used only one strategy, the others
adopted a combination of strategies. We also found that remedial recommendations provided by
corrective action strategy included actions that the breached company would take and/or the
actions that it would recommend that the affected customers take. Finally, as the response letters
provided the date of the breach, we found that while some organizations responded shortly after
the data breach incident, the others responded much later.
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Table 2. Response Strategies Included in Data Breach Response Letters
Strategy Type
Corrective Action Only

Number of Letters
27

Apology Only

0

Compensation Only

0

Corrective Action + Apology
Corrective Action +
Compensation
Apology + Compensation

16
22

Corrective Action + Apology +
Compensation

16

Statement Example
We retained a leading security
firm to help us understand the
nature and scope of the matter.
Please contact your debit or
credit card issuer to have your
card replaced by calling the
number on the back of your
personal credit or debit card.
We apologize for any
inconvenience this incident has
caused.
We are providing you with two
years of credit monitoring at no
charge to you. To activate your
free credit monitoring, please
call the number below and it
will be set up for you.

9

Expectancy Violation Theory
We use expectancy violation theory (EVT) to frame our research model. EVT was
originally developed by Burgoon and Jones (1976) to explain how individuals perceive and
interpret violations of their personal space (Baven et al. 2014). According to the EVT, humans
hold expectations to characterize and frame their interactions with others and perceive the
interactions and subsequently behave with considering these expectations (Afifi and Metts 1998;
Baven et al. 2014; Burgoon 1993). An expectation is a consistent pattern of predictable behavior
and should be considered within the specific individual, context and relationship (Burgoon
1993). Expectations can also be comprehended by understanding interactional content and
relational subtext (Burgoon and Walther 1990). While content schemas are receiver-stored
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knowledge about objects and events, relational schemas are the receiver’s expectations for
different ways people relate to one another (Housle and Acker 1979).
According to the EVT, breaking taken-for-granted rules such as information privacy
violate expectations and influence relationships (Afifi and Metts 1998). In particular, Afifi and
Metts (1998) define expectation violation as a behavior that a receiver notices as being different
from the behavioral display that an individual expected. Burgoon (1978) argues that any
behavior that falls outside of a range of expected behaviors produces cognitive arousal and
triggers an interpretation-evaluation sequence that individuals can use to tackle negative
outcomes. The expectations that are far from the expected range of behaviors are salient and
provoke immediate and large changes in the relationships (Afifi and Metts 1998). Thus, violating
basic expectations in any relationship provides strong negative perceptions and subsequently
negative actions.
Information systems research has used expectancy violation theory to understand
individuals’ relationships in digital contexts and how these relationships are affected by the
violation of expectations. For example, McLaughlin and Vitak (2012) identify several
expectancy violations in Facebook context, such as posting too many status updates, being too
emotional in status updates and wall posts, engaging in conflicts, heated interactions, or namecalling, and posting/tagging inappropriate photos of the individual. Baven et al. (2014) apply
EVT to investigate the expectancy violation that leads to being unfriended on Facebook. In a
data breach context, Gwebu et al. (2018) use EVT to explain an organization’s failure to protect
data violates its stakeholders’ expectancy, which produces negative reciprocates such as
decreasing market value.
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Data breaches disclose customers’ private information and prior research argues that
violating information privacy is an exemplar of confounding the individual’s expectations (Afifi
and Metts 1998). After hearing about a data breach incident, customer’s expectation about the
focal company’s data protection is violated. The EVT expounds the damaged relationship after
violating the expectations and describes consequential behaviors, which makes this theory
appropriate for this study and the data breach context.
Research Model and Hypotheses
We present our research model of the effect of response strategies on the customers’
behaviors based on the prior discussions of crisis response strategies, data breach response
research, the content analysis of data breach response letters, and expectation violation theory
(Figure 1). In addition to the response strategies found in the content analysis of response letters,
some organizations do not respond to the data breaches and try to cover the data breach.10 As
such, we incorporate “No Action” as the other breached organization response strategy to
compare its effect with the effects of other adopted strategies. The companies also respond to
data breaches at different periods of time. While some companies respond to their data breaches
immediately, others delay notifying the stakeholders about the event. This delay is proposed to
affect the strength of response strategies and is included in the research model (Figure 1).

10

For instance, Uber did not disclose its data breach incident that exposed personal data on 57 million people in
November 2016 and instead paid $100,000 to keep the two perpetrators of the theft silent (Vijayan 2018).
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Response Strategy
Accommodative
No Action

Apology

Corrective
Acction

Compensation

Response Time
Private Action
Switching
Behavior

Perceived
Expectancy
Violation

Dissatisfaction

Public Action
Negative WOM

Figure 1. Data Breach Response Strategy, Time, and Customer’s Behaviors
Prior research on consumer complaining behavior has found that when customers become
dissatisfied with a company, they take private and public actions (for a review see Istanbulluoglu
et al. 2017). Private actions are customer’s behaviors that the focal company is not able to detect,
such as when the customer decides to use the products/services of an alternative company, and
public actions are those that the focal company might notice, such as when a customer comment
negatively about a company’s data breach on social media (Istanbulluoglu et al. 2017). Further,
prior data breach studies have found that customers take private action (switching behavior) and
public action (negative word-of-mouth) stemming from data breach incidents (Choi et al. 2016;
Martin et al. 2017). Therefore, to assess customer reaction to data breaches, we include switching
behavior and negative WOM as the two most prominent behavioral outcomes of an incident. We
also use age, gender, internet experience, and data breach media exposure as the control
variables because their importance is acknowledged in prior information disclosure research
(e.g., Malhotra et al. 2004). Table 3 shows all constructs of the research model with their
definitions.
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Table 3. Constructs and Definitions
Constructs
Perceived Expectancy Violation
Dissatisfaction

Response
Strategies

No Action
Corrective Action
Apology
Compensation
Accommodative

Response Time
Switching Behavior
Negative WOM

Definitions
To what extent users believe that data breach has violated
their expectations of the organization’s data protection.
Perceived discrepancy between prior expectations about
data protection and perceived performance after the data
breach incident.
Providing no official response to the stakeholders after
the data breach.
Taking protective actions to remedy the negative
outcomes after the data breach.
Explicitly apologizing to the customers after the data
breach.
Providing a product or service to the customers after a
data breach.
Accepting the responsibility for data breaches and taking
remedial actions that includes either or a combination of
corrective action, apology, and compensation.
The time taken by the breached company to publicly
respond to the data breach.
Customer likelihood of discontinuing the relationship in
favor of a similar alternative.
Customer negative e-communications to others about the
breached organization.

Mediating Role of Dissatisfaction
EVT discusses that when the communicator violates expectancies to a degree that
exceeds the receiver's sensitivity, the violation is posited to intensify the receiver’s arousal
(Burgoon and Hale 1988). If the violations lead to sensitive and private information disclosure,
they immediately arouse cognitive beliefs that immensely change or terminate the relationships
(Afifi and Metts 1998). Accordingly, when customers provide their personal information to
companies as the requirement of purchasing products or receiving services, they expect that the
organizations stringently protect their information. The social norm in any customer-provider
relationship is that the private information of each party is not revealed by the other party. In a
data breach incident, when customers find out that their information is disclosed, and criminals
such as hackers have access to their information, their negative emotions regarding the breached
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companies will arouse. In this regard, Beaudry and Pinsonneault (2010) categorize emotions
about IT events based on opportunity, threat, perceived lack of control over expected
consequences and perceived control over expected consequences. When the event is perceived as
a threat and there is a lack of control over the expected consequences, loss emotions such as
dissatisfaction arouse (Beaudry and Pinsonneault 2010). Data breach events arouse loss emotions
because customers perceive these events as a threat, and they are not able to control the
consequences of disclosing their information, potentially to cybercriminals. As such, customers
become dissatisfied with their relationship with the companies as the data breach violates their
expectations from the company to protect their information.
The research on the customer-provider relationship constantly shows that dissatisfaction
impacts post-event-behaviors. For instance, Zeelenberg and Pieters (2004) find that when
customers are dissatisfied with the company in any way, they show negative behaviors, such as
switching to another company and spread negative word of mouth. In a data breach aftermath,
customers show negative behaviors by taking public and private actions. For example, after
revealing that 50 million Facebook users’ private information was collected in 2014 by a
political data firm that was associated with Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, an
online campaign with #DeleteFacebook spread negative words about Facebook and encouraged
people to delete their Facebook accounts (Montgomery 2018). A study also found that 70% of
customers terminate their relationship with a business after a data breach incident (Urrico 2017).
We posit in our model that when customers are dissatisfied with the breached organization
because their personal information was revealed as the company was not able to secure
customers’ data sufficiently, they switch to another company or spread negative WOM.
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According to the EVT, when an individual is shocked by an unexpected negative
behavior, his or her negative emotion is triggered and leads to negative behaviors. Consistent
with the EVT and the above discussion, we suggest that when a data breach incident violates
customers’ expectations about company data protection, dissatisfaction as a loss emotion is
aroused and ultimately prompts switching to another company and spreading negative WOM.
Thus, we hypothesize that:
H1: Dissatisfaction fully mediates the relationship between perceived expectancy violation and
(a) switching behavior and (b) negative WOM.
Moderating Role of Response Strategies
Organizations that encounter crisis follow post-crisis strategies to alleviate negative
publicity and negative stakeholders’ behaviors, minimizing the overall cost of the crisis. To
choose an appropriate response strategy, managers first need to know the response strategies
available to them— as each response strategy requires specific resources— and then analyze the
crisis situation (Coombs 1998). Each crisis situation based on its characteristics needs a different
response strategy. For example, data breach events that disclose customers’ personal information
violates individuals’ privacy but the collapse of an organizational building (another crisis)
threatens the individuals’ safety. As such, the response strategy for data breaches might differ
from the strategy adopted after a building collapse. Based on our content analysis of the response
strategies organizations adopted after data breaches, we found that while some organizations did
not respond to data breaches (e.g., Uber), others predominantly adopted accommodative
strategies (Table 2).
We gain some limited insight from prior studies that examine the effect of various
response strategies on individuals’ perceptions and behaviors after the crisis. For instance, Lee
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and Song (2010) find that in responding to major customer online complaints, organizations that
follow a no-action strategy and a defensive strategy have similar outcomes. Chang et al. (2015)
find that response strategies have positive effects on customers’ perceptions and behaviors and
accommodative strategies can decrease the likelihood of customers’ engagement in negative
WOM. In the information privacy violation context, Bansal and Zahedi (2015) investigate the
company responses that can repair trust after online privacy violation and find that apology as an
accommodative strategy affects repaired trust more than no-action. In a similar vein, we argue
that in the context of a data breach aftermath, the breached companies can decrease the negative
outcomes of data breaches by implementing accommodative strategies (i.e., corrective action,
apology, and compensation) and these will be superior to a no-action strategy.
It is noteworthy that individuals have been known to not behave rationally in privacy
decision-making settings where their decisions are affected by immediate gratification that
values present benefits more than future risks (Acquisti 2004). Prior research found that
individuals are willing to risk losing their private information if they are offered compensation
(Kokolakis 2017). Dinev et al. (2015) discuss information privacy decision making and state that
“because people overreact to the losses and “free” offers…any reward that appears as a free
gift will have a disproportionally large impact on decision making” (Dinev et al. 2015, p. 648).
As such, we argue that providing financial compensation to the affected customers after a data
breach demonstrates the perception of a higher level of remorse and has a greater effect on
customers than other types of accommodative strategies. In this light, Goode et al. (2017) look
into Sony PlayStation Network data breach and find that offering compensation after data
breaches can greatly influence continuance intention and repurchase intention. Further, many
customers routinely disclose private information in exchange for compensation (Dinev et al.
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2015; Kokolakis 2017). Based on this, we believe that compensation is more effective than
apology and corrective action to decrease the negative consequences of data breaches. Thus, we
hypothesize that:
H2: Accommodative response strategies (corrective action, apology, compensation, and a
combination of) negatively moderate the relationships between dissatisfaction and the outcome
variables, such that when these responses are provided the relationships between dissatisfaction
and (a) switching behavior and (b) negative WOM become weaker.
H3: The moderating effect of compensation is stronger than apology and correction action on the
relationships between dissatisfaction and (a) switching behavior and (b) negative WOM.
Moderating Role of Response Time
Data breach notification laws have been enacted irregularly and have changed over time in
U.S. states since 2002. In general, the laws require breached companies to notify their
stakeholders about the breach and explain the type of disclosed information. While the laws in
many states share some core similarities, state legislators have decided to pass laws that best
protect the interests of stakeholders in their respective states. As a result, some states have more
stringent laws and demand severe penalties for violations. For example, while California requires
the breached companies to immediately respond to data breaches, some other states allow the
breached company to delay their responses. For instance, Florida allows the breached
organizations to prompt the stakeholders within 30 days after the data breach incident and
Alabama and Ohio allow 45 days11.
In addition to the response delay officially considered in data breach notification laws of
many states, some organizations do not respond to their data breaches and try to “hide” the

11

Customers are usually not aware of data breach notification laws and required notification time frame in each
state; so, they act based on when and how the breach company responds to the data breach incident.
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events from public scrutiny. For example, Uber was hacked in 2016 and personal information of
57 million customers and drivers was stolen by cybercriminals, but Uber did not respond to the
data breach and paid the hackers $100,000 to cover up the incident (Chappell 2018). However,
security experts highly recommend that the breached organizations respond to data breaches as
soon as possible to boost the efficacy of their response strategies and assuage the negative
reactions to the data breaches (Hawthorn 2016; Matteson 2017). Research also emphasizes that
the response time to the crisis should be as short as possible. Coombs (2006) argues that crisis
managers should inform stakeholders immediately what to do to protect themselves. Ulmer and
Sellnow (2002) discuss that the organization should act quickly to illustrate in good faith that it is
going to follow through on the pledges or promises it communicates. As a matter of fact, when
the companies respond without delay to the data breach events, they demonstrate that they care
about their customers and are determined to take action to remedy the outcomes of data breaches.
Further, if the companies do not respond to the crisis immediately, another party such as a
journalist, a competitor, and an anonymous hater might reveal the data breach12 through Twitter
and Facebook that increases the negative aftereffects— in the world of public perception, the
first mover has the advantage (Temin 2015). Therefore, we propose that when the data breach
responses are provided early after data breaches, they are more effective than when they are
announced with a delay. Thus, we hypothesize:
H4: Response time impacts the moderating effect of accommodative response strategies on the
relationships between dissatisfaction and (a) switching behavior and (b) negative WOM, such

12

In 2018, The New York Times and The Observer reported that Cambridge Analytica Ltd (CA) had achieved and
used personal data about Facebook users from an external researcher who had told Facebook he was collecting it for
academic purposes. The personal data of up to 87 million Facebook users—without their consent— were acquired
for political advertising purposes. This data breach event is known as “Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data
scandal”, which precipitated a massive fall in Facebook’s stock price (Deagon 2018).
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that with short response time the moderating effect of accommodative response strategies is
stronger.
Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we use the factorial survey method—specifically examining how
survey respondents would react to response strategies and response time. Further, many
companies adopt a combination of responses after a data breach (Table 2) and a factorial survey
allows us to test different combinations of the responses in a systematic manner, as described
below.
Factorial Survey
The factorial survey method is an advanced approach to the scenario survey and uses
scenarios that “present subjects with written descriptions of realistic situations and then request
responses on a number of rating scales that measure the dependent variables of interest” (Trevino
1992, pp. 127-128). The objective of the factorial survey method is to “uncover the social and
individual structures of human judgments of social objects” (Wallander 2009, p. 505). The
factorial survey method differs from typical scenario-based surveys in that description of
scenarios is experimentally manipulated and varied (Vance et al. 2015). This technique combines
the rich number of factors afforded by field survey methods with the control and orthogonality
provided by experimental designs (Rossi 1979).
Prior research discusses that the factorial survey is neither an experiment nor a traditional
survey but combines both methods to provide a unique research method (Vance et al. 2015).
Like experiments, factorial surveys incorporate dimensions or factors of research interest. Each
dimension involves several levels, which is akin to treatments in an experimental factor. These
dimensions (factors) and levels are converted into textual scenarios. The method is named a
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factorial survey as a full combination of all factors and levels is possible (Vance et al. 2015).
The full factorial ensures that the levels are orthogonal, with correlations at or near zero, thus
overcoming the problem of multicollinearity (Jasso 2006). Orthogonality enables us to
distinguish clearly between the different effects of response strategies and response time on
customers’ behaviors. While traditional experimental designs support a limited dimension with a
few levels each before becoming impractically complex (Rossi and Anderson 1982), factorial
surveys do not have such limitations. As the factorial survey utilizes random sampling, many
factors and levels can be adopted to create a factorial of hundreds, thousands, or even millions of
unique scenario combinations (Jasso 2006). In the factorial survey, each survey participant
receives a factor from a number of combined factors and gives a response based on the treatment
that manipulated in that factor.
Scenario Design
To create our factorial survey, we provided two sets of scenarios to describe a data breach
event (scenario A) and the response strategy and time (scenario B), as shown in Appendix B.
First, participants were asked to provide the name of a company that they actually use and need
to provide some personal information to get service/product. Then, the participants were shown
scenario A in which the description of the data breach happened in the company they use. This
was mentioned at the beginning of the survey (Appendix B). Subsequently, the participants
answered the survey items regarding the independent variables of the research model. After this,
scenario B was provided that describes the response strategy and response time (Appendix B
shows an example of scenario B). To examine the effect of response strategies and response
time, we used a series of 2 (response time) x 3 (accommodative response strategies) betweensubjects factorial survey. As we use the factorial survey, a full combination of all factors is
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possible. Our factorial survey constitutes three levels of response strategies that are provided
with either short or long response time (Table 4). In level 1, the three response strategies are
provided to the participants separately and, in level 2, two-by-two combinations of the responses
are described in the scenarios. Finally, in level 3, a combination of all three response strategies
was developed and included in the scenario. Consequently, our factorial survey included 14
factors (different scenario Bs) that each participant was randomly assigned to one of 14 scenarios
(Table 4). Further, as we also examine no action strategy, we did not provide scenario B (that
includes a response strategy) and used no action strategy as the control group. Overall, our
scenario design incorporated 15 conditions.
Table 4. Factorial Survey Levels and Conditions
Short
Response
Time

Level 1
Apology

Long
Response
Time

Apology

Total

6

Corrective
Action

Compensation

Corrective
Action

Compensation

Level 2
Apology &
Corrective
Action
Apology &
Corrective
Action
6

Apology &
Compensation

Corrective
Action &
Compensation

Apology &
Compensation

Corrective
Action &
Compensation

Level 3
Apology &
Corrective
Action &
Compensation
Apology &
Corrective
Action &
Compensation
2

14

Measurement Items
We adapted the scales for the constructs in the model from prior literature, as shown in
Appendix C. We adapted the items of perceived expectancy violation from Affifi and Metts
(1998) and those of dissatisfaction from Bhattacherje (2001). We borrowed the scales of
switching behavior and negative WOM from Choi et al. (2016) and Martin et al. (2017),
respectively. We measured response time by providing short response time (24 hours) and long
response time (30 days) in textual factors. We chose 24 hours13 for short response time because

13

We initially chose 48 hours for early response, but the results of pilot study analyses showed that response time
manipulation check did not pass successfully because the respondents did not perceive 48 hours as a short response

86

practice and research recommend an immediate response to the crisis (Coombs 2006; Hawthorn
2016; Matteson 2017) and chose 30 days for long response time because among different
applications of data breach notification laws in all states, 30 day-response time is minimum. So,
in all states that allow breached organizations not to respond to data breaches immediately, the
breached companies have at least 30 days to respond. We provided different descriptions for
each of the accommodative response strategies (corrective action, apology, and compensation) in
the scenarios and combined the descriptions to make 14 factors of our factorial survey. All items
are 7-point Likert scales.
Data Collection Procedures
Our data collection follows a systematic approach that constitutes three phases—pretest,
pilot study, and primary study. In the pretest phase, we solicited five IS researchers who had a
Ph.D. to review our survey and provide feedback. They gave us several suggestions about the
scenarios and the clarity of the survey items. We also found that the manipulations were not
salient in the scenarios and the manipulation check for response time did not pass. Therefore, we
conducted a verbal protocol and reviewed the questions one-by-one to ensure the clarity of items.
Then, we revised the scenarios and made the survey items clearer and appropriate to the data
breach context based on the suggestions and the verbal protocol. After revising the factorial
survey, we sent the survey back to the five IS researchers. This time, they mentioned that
scenarios and the survey items were much clearer, and the manipulation check was also
successful. We then conducted a pilot study with 110 respondents who were similar to our
respondents in the main study. We used the pilot study to do preliminary analyses such as
reliability and validity of constructs, clarity of scenarios, and manipulation checks. In this stage,

time. Thus, we changed the response time to 24 hours for primary study and the manipulation check passed
successfully, as described later.

87

the response time manipulation check required us to set the early response time to 24 hours for
primary study.
For the primary study, we initially collected 1000 responses from CloudResearch by
monetary incentivizing US respondents. The requirement to participate in this study was being
an adult over 18 years of age who provides personal information to purchase products/services
from retail outlets. We removed the responses that did not correctly answer the pay-attention
questions or took the survey in a very short time (i.e., less than five minutes). Finally, the sample
size of the primary study data was 811 for further analyses, which was ample to have the power
of 0.9, with a medium-size effect and 0.05 significance level, for each of 15 groups of the
factorial survey (Liang et al. 2019). Demographics of primary study participants (Appendix D)
show a fairly equal spread of gender, age, marriage, internet experience, income, and education
among the study participants, indicating the sample reasonably represents the population of
affected customers of a breached company.
Common Method Variance
A potential issue in survey-based research is a common method variance that can provide
flawed results and misleading interpretations (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We conducted two tests to
investigate common method variance in this study. First, we used Harmon’s one-factor test14
using exploratory factor analysis to examine if one component explains more than 50 percent of
the model or a single factor emerges (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). The results show that the first
factor explains 32 percent and multiple factors appeared. We also used Lindell and Whitney’s
(2001) marker variable test using the smallest observed correlation in the dataset. The matrices
of item-to-item correlations demonstrate the marker variable has non-significant correlations
Despite criticisms against Harmon’s one-factor test, recent IS research still uses this method as a valid
examination of common method variance (e.g., Goode et al. 2017).
14
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(ranging from -0.03 to 0.02) with the other four research constructs. Therefore, this study does
not suffer from common method variance.
Manipulation Check
To check manipulation of response time, we asked the respondents if the response time
was late. The results t (810) = 10.81, p < 0.001 show that the respondents differently perceived
short response time (M = 2.94, SD = 1.66) and long response time (M = 6.37, SD = 1.17). We
asked one question for each three main response strategies (apology, corrective action,
compensation) to ensure the participants understood the different response strategies provided to
them. Each group received three questions related the response strategies. For example, the
group that received “apology only” received three questions about whether the company
response included apology, corrective action (recommendations), and compensation. The results
of MANOVA show significant differences between every pair of the three response strategies
(apology condition: F [2, 307] = 92.22, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.37; corrective action condition:
F [2, 307] = 66.20, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.30; compensation condition: F [2, 307] = 84.82, p <
0.001, partial η2 = 0.35). Thus, manipulation of response strategies was successful.
Research Model Testing Results
We estimated the structural model with partial least squares (PLS) because when the
sample size is small and the variables do not follow a normal distribution, PLS can examine the
relationships of the model better (Zhang et al. 2011). We used Smart-PLS 3.2 to conduct the PLS
analysis in two stages. In the first stage, we tested whether the measures used as the
operationalization of the model constructs are reliable and valid (the measurement model). After
establishing the adequacy of the measurement model, we proceeded to the second stage and
estimate the path coefficients of the research model (the structural model). We finally compared
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path coefficients across multiple groups using multigroup analysis (MGA). The subsequent
sections report the results for these stages.
Measurement Model
We evaluated the reliability and validity of the data based on prior recommendations
(e.g., Straub et al. 2004). Table 5 shows the means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of the
measures as well as the inter-variable correlations for each of the three datasets in this study. All
the values of Cronbach alpha (α) and composite reliability (CR) exceed the recommended
threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally 1978), supporting the reliabilities of all constructs. Table 5 also
shows convergent validity is supported by all values of average variance extracted (AVE) being
above the threshold of 0.50. Table 6 shows discriminant validity is supported by all inter-variable
correlations being below the square roots of the associated variables’ AVE values (Segars,
1997). Loadings and cross-loadings show the items differentially represent the variables of the
research model (Appendix E).
Table 5. Descriptives, Reliabilities, and Average Variance Extracted
Age
Gender
Internet Experience
Data Breach Media Exposure
Perceived Expectancy Violation
Dissatisfaction
Switching Behavior
Negative WOM

Mean
37.92
0.49
18.50
4.75
5.41
5.24
4.81
3.91

S.D.
14.33
0.50
6.02
1.54
1.32
1.27
1.38
1.57

α
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.83
0.91
0.91
0.92

C.R.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.90
0.94
0.94
0.95

AVE
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.86

Note. S.D. = standard deviation; α = Cronbach alpha; C.R. = composite reliability.
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Table 6. Correlation and Square-Root of Average Variance Extracted
1
1. Age

2

3

4

5

2. Gender

N/A
-0.7

3. Internet Experience

0.39***

N/A
-0.01

4. Data Breach Media Exposure

0.08*

0.05

N/A
0.06

N/A

5. Perceived Expectancy Violation

0.05

-0.15***

0.02

0.11**

0.87
0.40***

6

6. Dissatisfaction

-0.02

0.00

-0.01

0.24***

7. Switching Behavior

-0.04

0.02

-0.02

0.19***

0.15***

0.90
0.49***

8. Negative WOM

-0.09**

0.09**

-0.13***

0.22***

0.15***

0.47***

7

8

0.93
0.53***

0.93

Note. Diagonal is square root of average variance extracted (AVE). * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***
p < 0.001.
Structural Model
We analyzed the base relationships of the model with “No Action” group that represents
the control group. As discussed earlier, a response to the data breach event is not provided in
“No Action” group so that we could examine whether various response strategies are impactful.
Table 7 shows the results of testing the base relationships of the model with reasonable
explanatory power (R2 Switching Behavior = 0.28 and R2 Negative WOM = 0.27). Table 7 shows that
perceived expectancy violation (β = 0.42, p < 0.001) positively affects dissatisfaction.
Customers’ dissatisfaction with the company after a data breach increases (β = 0.50, p < 0.001)
switching behavior and (β = 0.43, p < 0.001) negative WOM. While perceived expectancy
violation does not directly affect switching behavior and negative WOM (Table 7), it indirectly
increases (β = 0.38, p < 0.001) switching behavior and (β = 0.28, p < 0.001) negative WOM
through dissatisfaction. Thus, dissatisfaction fully mediates the relationship between perceived
expectancy violation and switching behavior and negative WOM, supporting H1a and H1b.
Control variables mainly do not affect the dependent variables but internet experience (β = -0.19,
p < 0.05) and data breach media exposure (β = 0.15, p < 0.05) affect negative WOM.
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Table 7. Structural Model Estimates for the Base Relationships
Dissatisfaction Switching Behavior
Age
-0.06
0.14
Gender
0.04
-0.06
Internet Experience
-0.01
0.00
***
Data Breach Media Exposure
0.20
-0.07
***
Perceived Expectancy Violation 0.42
-0.05
Dissatisfaction
0.66***
R2
0.23
0.28
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Negative WOM
-0.01
0.10
-0.19*
0.15*
0.09
0.57***
0.27

Table 8. Indirect Paths Results
Switching Behavior Negative WOM
Perceived Expectancy Violation Dissatisfaction 0.38***
0.28***
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Multigroup Analysis
We conducted MGA to test the moderation effects of our study because prior research
argues that MGA is the appropriate method to estimate the moderating effects when the
moderator variable is a discrete variable (Eberl 2010; Henseler 2007; Sarstedt et al. 2011). In
MGA, the discrete variable divides the sample data into a group of sub-samples and in each of
separate sub-samples, the same PLS path model is analyzed (Eberl 2010; Henseler 2007). The
moderators are discrete variables, leading us to analyze the PLS path model using MGA. We
divided our sample data into groups of sub-samples based on different data breach response
strategies and response times. Table 9 (a and b) shows the base relationships of the model for
each group that is hypothesized and Table 10 shows MGA results. To test H2 and the moderating
effect of accommodative strategies, we combined all the conditions of level 1, 2, and 3 of the
factorial survey (Table 4). Table 9 shows that although the effect of dissatisfaction on both
switching behavior and negative WOM is significant in accommodative response strategies
condition, it is lower in the no-action condition. Table 10 shows that the difference in values of
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the dissatisfaction to switching behavior and negative WOM is significant. In other words,
accommodative response strategies decrease the effect on dissatisfaction on switching behavior
and negative WOM. Thus, H2a and H2b are supported. “Compensation only” response
significantly decreases the effect of dissatisfaction on customers’ behaviors (Tables 9 and 10).
“Corrective action only” response does not moderate the relationship between dissatisfaction and
customers’ behaviors but “apology only”, similar to compensation, negatively moderates the
effect of dissatisfaction on switching behavior and negative WOM. Table 10 shows that the
moderating effect of compensation is not stronger than apology and, thus, H4 is not supported.
To test hypothesis 5, we tested whether the moderating effect of accommodative response
strategies differs in early and late response time. Tables 9 and 10 show that comparing to late
response strategies, the lambda values of early accommodative response strategies are
significant. The moderating effect of accommodative response strategies is significant only when
these responses are provided early. Therefore, response time affects the moderating effect of
accommodative response strategies and H5 is supported.

Corrective Action
only

Compensation only

Early
Accommodative
Response Strategies

Late Accommodative
Response Strategies

Age
0.14
-0.02
Gender
-0.06
0.02
Internet
0.00
0.00
Experience
Media Exposure
-0.07
0.08*
Dissatisfaction
0.66***
0.48***
Sample Size
105
714
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Apology only

Accommodative
Response Strategies

No Action

Table 9a. Structural Model Estimates for Different Groups (Switching Behavior)

-0.04
0.18*
0.13

-0.02
-0.19*
0.08

-0.09
0.10
-0.03

-0.04
0.08
-0.04

0.00
-0.03
0.07

-0.05
0.45***
101

0.04
0.64***
105

0.16
0.42***
98

0.06
0.44***
335

0.12**
0.57***
359
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Table 10. Multigroup Comparisons
Comparing samples

No Action— Accommodative Response
Strategies
No Action— Early Accommodative
Response Strategies
No Action— Late Accommodative
Response Strategies
No Action— Apology
No Action— Corrective Action
No Action— Compensation
Apology— Compensation
* p < 0.05

Corrective Action
only

Compensation only

Early
Accommodative
Response Strategies

Late Accommodative
Response Strategies

Age
-0.01
-0.05
Gender
0.10
0.08*
Internet
-0.19*
-0.11*
Experience
Media Exposure 0.15**
0.11*
Dissatisfaction
0.57***
0.41***
Sample Size
105
714
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Apology only

Accommodative
Response Strategies

No Action

Table 9b. Structural Model Estimates for Different Groups (Negative WOM)

-0.04
0.06
-0.03

-0.19*
0.00
0.00

-0.03
0.04
-0.21*

-0.02
0.12*
-0.16**

-0.07
0.05
-0.05

0.30***
0.42***
101

-0.05
0.58***
105

0.23*
0.41***
98

0.13*
0.34***
335

0.10*
0.47***
359

Dissatisfaction
Switching Behavior
Δ
0.18*

Dissatisfaction
 Negative
WOM
Δ
0.16*

0.21*

0.22*

0.14

0.10

0.21*
0.02
0.24*
0.01

0.15*
0.01
0.15*
0.03

Post-hoc Analysis
We conducted several post-hoc analyses to dig deeper into the effect of response
strategies and response times on switching behavior and negative WOM. First, we investigated if
the response strategies have an additive effect and their combination has a more positive effect
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than when they are provided separately. To do so, we looked up the effect of level 3 of factors
(Table 4) and examined the moderating impact of the response strategy that includes the
combination of apology, corrective action, and compensation. Table 11 shows the results of the
structural model for this condition and Table 12 shows that this strategy significantly moderates
the effect of dissatisfaction on switching behavior and negative WOM. Although by comparing
Tables 9, 10, and 11 we can conclude that the combination of all three response strategies
decreases the effect of dissatisfaction more than apology alone and compensation alone, Table 12
shows that the combination of response strategies does not significantly have more impact than
apology alone and compensation alone. We also tested the combinations of two strategies (e.g.,
apology and compensation) from level 2 and found similar results— while they moderate the
effect of dissatisfaction on the two dependent variables of the study, their moderating effects are
not stronger than apology and compensation alone. Thus, the response strategies do not have an
additive effect and the effect of compensation or apology is no less than when they are combined
together. Second, as apology only and compensation only have negative moderating effects, we
examined if these moderating effects depend on response time. We examined the moderating
effect of apology and compensation with early and late response times (Table 11) and we found
that the effect of these response strategies is significant only when they are provided with early
response time (Table 12).
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Table 11. Post-hoc Structural Model Estimates

0.44

-0.04

0.07

-0.09

0.01

0.00

-0.20

0.27**

0.00

-0.07

0.38***

0.31**

0.67***

0.14
**

*

Late Compensation

-0.06

**

Early Compensation

-0.14*

Late Apology

-0.09

Early Apology

Late Compensation

0.04

Apology & Corrective
Action & Compensation

-0.03

Early Compensation

0.04

Late Apology

Age
Gender
Internet
Experience
Media
Exposure
Dissatisfaction

Negative WOM

Early Apology

Apology & Corrective
Action & Compensation

Switching Behavior

0.06

-0.02

0.03

0.07

-0.06

0.04

*

0.09

0.07

-0.28

0.09

0.16*

0.30***

0.56***

0.14
**

0.12
*

-0.37

0.00
***

-0.08

-0.19

-0.11

0.13

0.35**

0.15*

0.10

0.28**

0.33**

0.35**

0.48***

0.36***

0.48***

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Table 12. Post-hoc Multigroup Comparisons
Comparing samples

No Action— Apology & Corrective Action &
Compensation
Compensation— Apology & Corrective Action
& Compensation
Apology— Apology & Corrective Action &
Compensation
No Action— Early Apology
No Action— Late Apology
No Action— Early Compensation
No Action— Late Compensation
* p < 0.05

Dissatisfaction
Switching Behavior
Δ
0.28*

Dissatisfaction
Negative WOM
Δ
0.23*

0.04

0.07

0.07

0.09

0.34*
0.01
0.36*
0.10

0.22*
0.09
0.21*
0.09

Robustness Check
We conducted an event study with 165 official response letters after a data breach to do a
robustness check. As our research objectives seek to understand the effect of various adopted
response strategies with respect to response times, we tested the moderating effects of the model.
Appendix F describes the event study and confirms the findings of the factorial survey.
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Discussion
The number of exposed records by data breaches is on the rise and breached companies
adopt different response strategies after a data breach event. In this study, we first argue how the
relationship between a company and its customers is impaired due to data breaches. To this end,
we applied the EVT theory to explain how customer’s expectations about data protection from a
company violate by a data breach and how this violation leads to adverse effects. We then sought
to examine whether response strategies adopted by companies after a data breach event affect
customer’s behavior. We also considered the role of data breach notification laws and,
specifically response time, in preparing and providing response strategies. We found the EVT
theory is able to justify customer’s negative actions after a data breach and dissatisfaction
mediates the effect of perceived expectancy violation on switching behavior and negative WOM.
We also found that accommodative response strategies can moderate the relationship between
dissatisfaction and customer’s actions, but this moderating effect is only valid when response
time is short. These findings provide new insights into research on data breach response and
suggestions to managers developing response strategies in case their companies face
unauthorized information disclosure by data breaches.
Implications for Research
This study provides several implications for research based on the investigation of
company responses and the findings of data analyses (Table 13). First, the research on data
breach response suffers from two shortcomings— they either focused on a specific data breach
case (e.g., PlayStation Network data breach) or did not examine different actual response
strategies that breached companies have adopted (e.g., Bansal and Zahedi 2015; Goode et al.
2017). While crisis management studies found a variety of influential responses, such as denial,
justification, apology, and attack the accuser (Coombs 1998), it was not clear what strategies
97

breached companies employed after data breaches. Our investigation of 100 breached companies
shows while many companies responded to their data breach events, others attempted to hide the
incident and remained silent. The companies that responded to their data breaches took the
responsibility of the event and signaled their remorse by providing accommodative responses.
They used a combination of apology, corrective action, and compensation. We did not find any
company to take the defensive position and deny the event or use a moderate strategy and, for
example, justify the data breach. Perhaps because data breaches are done by external agents (i.e.,
hackers) and these incidents can be announced to the public by external sources (e.g., media
announced Facebook data breach in 2018). Other breached companies covered the data breach
and did not respond to the data breaches at all. These companies took a risk and hoped their data
breaches would not be revealed by media, putting them away from any possible negative
outcomes of their data breaches.
Table 13. Summary of Findings
Category
Adopted responses
Customer’s behavioral process

Response efficacy
Response time effectiveness

Responses aggregation

Key Findings
Breached companies either provide
accommodative responses or take no action.
The EVT theory explains the customer’s
reaction to the data breach: dissatisfaction
mediates the effect of “shock” after data
breach on switching and negative WOM
behaviors.
Corrective action alone is not influential, and
apology can be as effective as compensation.
Early responses to data breaches put the
breached companies in a more advantageous
position and decrease the negative percussions
effectively.
The effects of response strategies are not
additive.

Source
Content analysis of
notification letters
Hypothesis 1

Hypotheses 2, 3
Hypothesis 4

Post-hoc analysis

Second, this research finds that the EVT theory can explain the relationship between
customers and the breached company when a data breach incident occurs. The EVT theory
discusses that after expectation violation, individuals take positive or negative actions depending
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on whether the violation is higher or lower than their expectations (Burgoon and Jones 1976).
The EVT theory posits that the expectation violation should be considered in each context
(Burgoon 1993). As such, in the data breach context, customers expect that the company that
receives their personal information possesses a secure data protection mechanism. Any data
breach event shows that the data protection systems were not secure enough and makes
customers shocked and frustrated. However, we find that the “shock” of realizing the data breach
does not directly drive negative behaviors until cognitive arousal as reflected in dissatisfaction is
manifested. As a matter of fact, customer’s reaction to the data breaches is a behavioral process
in which the violation of the customer’s expectation does not provoke negative actions until an
individual evaluation about the data breach event is made. According to the EVT, when
expectancy violation occurs, individuals process and cope with it via an interpretation and
evaluation sequence that allows them to comprehend the transgressor, the violation behavior, and
how to behaviorally proceed (Bevan et al. 2014; Bachman and Guerrero 2006). Customers
evaluate how much the breached company was reckless and faulty to protect their information
and whether the data breach outweighs the benefits that they can gain from staying the
relationship with the breached company. If customers blame the company for insufficient
security of data protection systems and become dissatisfied with their relationships with
breached companies, they switch to another company that provides the same products/services
and/or spread negative words about the breached companies.
Third, although many customers become dissatisfied after a data breach and might leave
the breached company, the response strategies might intervene in the behavioral process and stop
it. To illustrate, comparing accommodative and no action response strategies, we find that
accommodative responses are able to manipulate the process that drives the customers to take
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negative private and public actions against the breached company. Thus, the findings of this
research show that the no-action response is not a successful strategy and that the breached
companies need to demonstrate their responsibility for disclosed information and strive to curb
the outcomes. However, there are several types of accommodative strategies and not each of
them is influential. Despite managers’ tendency to report what has happened and to provide
instructing information (Sturges 1994), we find that corrective action strategy does not affect the
customers. In fact, we find that the customers expect to see the breached company feels
remorseful and it accepts liability as the findings show that apology and compensation strategies
are able to decrease customers’ negative actions in spite of dissatisfaction after a data breach.
Prior data breach found the effective role of compensation after a data breach event (Goode et al.
2017) but a comprehensive investigation of adopted strategies in this research shows that other
strategies—such as apology— can be effective too. Apology demonstrates that the breaches
company accepts the responsibility for the data breach and asks for forgiveness (Benoit and
Drew 1997; Fuchs-Burnett 2002). While apology expresses concern for victims, compensation
offers the affected the customers something to offset the suffering (Coombs and Holladay 2008).
Prior research argues that apology is more expensive than compensation because when a
company apologizes, it opens itself to lawsuits and financial loss because apology can be used as
evidence in court to win lawsuits against the company (Coombs and Holladay 2008). Thus, while
apology and compensation are more expensive strategies than corrective action, they are
impactful in a data breach aftermath. The findings of post-hoc analysis reveal that the effects of
response strategies are not incremental and adding more responses to the notification letters
would not affect the customers further. Hence, for example, the combination of all three response
strategies are not more impactful than compensation and apology alone. Adding more responses
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would not be helpful while it adds more costs on the breached company’s shoulders. These
findings suggest that customers just demand to see the breached company is regretful and it is the
signal of remorse that impacts the customers, which explains why compensation that provides
financial offering is not more influential than apology.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the impact of
response time based on data breach notification laws after a data breach incident. Prior crisis
management research discusses that companies should respond to the crisis at the shortest
possible time (Coombs 2006) but the effect of time in the data breach context was not
empirically examined. This study finds that response time plays a vital role after a data breach
event and the efficacy of response strategies contingents upon time. The findings show that the
moderating effects of accommodative responses are significant when breached companies
provide them immediately. We find that apology, compensation, and their combinations will lose
their potency if companies employ these strategies one month after the announcement of data
breaches. These results suggest that customers care about the breached company’s response time
and take the response time as another signal that the breached company cares about the
customers and is determined to minimize the loss. Although data breach notification laws allow
the breached companies to delay the response notification, when companies provide response
notification late, customers take it as a cue that the breached company is apathetic about the data
breach incident. Customers might also perceive the late responses as the incapability of the
breached company to make a fast decision about the data breach or attribute the act of
responding to external forces, such as media and regulations. The findings also indicate that
response expediency is not substitutable with response strategies—providing a comprehensive
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form of response strategies in later time is not more competent than a single response strategy
provided in early time.
Implications for Practice
As data breaches are becoming prevalent, companies should prepare themselves not only
to protect their data against external threats but also how to react if a data breach occurs. The
latter is important to keep customers after a data breach and this study has several implications
that assist managers to choose the right strategic plan. First, some companies remain silent and
do not respond to data breaches, but we found that this strategy is harmful to companies and the
results show that breached companies should be responsible for what happened to information
customers’ information and opt for accommodative strategies. However, to choose an
accommodative strategy plan, managers should be cautious about the type of strategy they adopt.
We suggest that managers do not employ corrective action only and, at least, use this strategy
with other forms of accommodative responses. While we found that 27% of companies have
adopted corrective action only (Table 2), this strategy is not able to keep customers and avoid
affected people commenting negatively about the breached company.
Second, while we found that apology and compensation can be competent to maintain
customers and avert spreading negative words after a data breach incident, each of these
strategies requires different resources (Coombs 1998). This study shows that apology is as
effective as compensation and can help the companies to decrease the negative consequences of
a data breach event by a response strategy that requires fewer resources (i.e., apology). This
finding is especially important for companies that are low in budget. However, the effectiveness
of apology in our study relates to only two customer’s behaviors and managers might need to use
other strategies to influence other stakeholders and other customer’s behaviors. As such, this
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study suggests that managers include an apology in their notification letters when responding to
data breaches.
Finally, the findings of this study emphasize that communication with affected customers
is important, but this communication should take place in the shortest possible time after a data
breach. The results of this study show that accommodative strategies impact customers only
when breached companies respond immediately in a data breach aftermath. As such, although
data breach notification laws in some states allow that breached companies notify affected
customers until 45 days of the incident, this study suggests that breached companies respond
immediately. Otherwise accommodative responses would not be potent to avoid customers
taking negative private and public actions. The findings of response time can also be helpful for
legislators to revise data notifications laws and consider customers’ expectations about
responding to data breaches in a shorter time frame.
Limitations and Future Research
There are some limitations in this study that provide new avenues for future research.
First, we only examined accommodative strategies and contrasted them with no action strategy
because they were the only strategies that breached companies adopted. However, future
research can examine defensive and moderate strategies (e.g., justification) to understand if other
strategies are effective so that breached companies adopt them. To this end, future research can
do a cost-benefit analysis among all possible effective strategies to find the best strategy for
companies after a data breach. Second, we investigated response time by examining short (after
24 hours) and long (30 days) response time based on data breach notifications laws. As providing
a response immediately after a data breach can be resource-intensive and waiting for a longer
time to respond makes the strategies ineffective, future research can examine the optimum time
to respond to data breaches. Third, we only examined the effect of response strategies on only
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two customer’s behaviors and future research can examine the effect of such strategies on other
customer’s behaviors. Future research can also investigate whether response strategies affect
other stakeholders such as shareholders. Thus, we suggest that future research conduct event
studies find the effect of response strategies adopted by breached companies on their stock prices
after data breach events. Finally, this study was conducted in the USA and the participants were
customers of American companies and, therefore, the study is constrained to a particular cultural
and sociopolitical context. Future research can investigate the responses provided by breached
companies in other geographical locations and examine the effect of adopted responses on local
customers.
Conclusions
Despite considerable investment in information security, companies face data breaches
and subsequently lose many their customers. Breached companies adopt various response
strategies to mitigate the negative consequences of data breaches. In this study, we first
investigated the customer’s initial reaction to data breaches and used the EVT theory to
understand how the relationship between the customer and the company is impaired. Then, we
examined 100 breached companies to identify the response strategies that the breached
companies adopted. We designed 2 (response time) x 3 (response strategies) scenarios based on a
factorial survey (n = 811) with 15 conditions.
The findings of this research show that data breaches violate customer’s expectations that
increases satisfaction and ultimately leads to leaving or spreading negative words about the
company. However, the companies can positively manipulate customer’s behavioral process by
showing their regret and determination to lower data breach aftereffects. To do so, companies
can adopt apology or compensation, but these strategies are impactful only when they are
provided early after a data breach event.
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Essay 2 Appendices
Appendix A—An Illustrative Response Letter
After investigating of internal security, Boeing found a data breach that affected 36000
individuals. Boeing notified Washington state Attorney General and officials in California, North
Carolina and Massachusetts and affected people by providing the following letter.
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Coding
By reading Boeing’s letter, we found that the letter includes all apology, corrective
action, and compensation. Table A1 shows how we coded the letter based on included
statements.
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Table A1. Coding the illustrative Response Letter
Response Strategy
Statement in the Letter
Apology
We sincerely apologize for this incident…
Corrective Action
We recommend that you take the following steps to protect your
identity…
Compensation
We are offering a complimentary two-year membership of
Experian’s ProtectMYID Elite.
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Appendix B— Scenario Design
Scenario A— Data Breach Incident
Users provide their information to companies for purchasing and using services.
However, hackers can hack these companies and steal users’ information, which is called a data
breach. So, in this survey, we need to know your perceptions and beliefs about data breaches.
Please provide the name of one online company that you are a customer of and you need
to provide the credit card information to purchase products or get services from.
{Name of Company}
Now imagine you have just realized that the company you mentioned above (hereafter we
call it “this company”) has faced a major data breach. You have found out that your credit card
information was disclosed due to the data breach. Please answer the rest of the questions based
on this event.
Scenario B— Short Response Time and Combination of Apology & Corrective Action &
Compensation
After only 24 hours of the data breach event, the breached company provides the following
response:
“We apologize for what happened and we strive to maintain extensive security and privacy
programs. We are taking a number of steps (recommendations) for your protection:
We recently locked online access to your account(s). If you haven’t already done so, you’ll be
prompted to reset your password the next time you sign in. Please make sure your new password
is unique. We’ll continue monitoring your account(s) for suspicious activity. We’re providing two
years of free credit monitoring and identity protection with TransUnion’s credit monitoring
service. We also give you a 10% discount for your next purchase.”
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Appendix C— Measurement Items
Constructs
Perceived
Expectancy
Violation

Measurement
1. I did not expect that this company could not protect my
information against the data breach attack.
2. I was shocked that this company could not protect my
information against the data breach attack.
3. I was surprised that this company could not protect my
information against the data breach attack.
Dissatisfaction After data breach, how do you feel about your overall
relationship with the breached company?
1. dissatisfied/ satisfied
2. displeased/ pleased
3. frustrated/ contented
4. Absolutely terrible/ absolutely delighted
Switching
To what extent do you agree with the following statements if
Behavior
another company offers you the same products/services:
1. I will look for an alternative online store for better service.
2. I will think about switching to an alternative online store.
3. I will consider another online store as my major service
provider.
Negative
After the data breach event, I would likely:
WOM
1. Spread negative word of mouth about the company.
2. Bad-mouth the company to my friends, relatives, or
acquaintances.
3. Tell others not to choose them if asked about their
products/services.
Data Breach
How much have you heard or read during the last year about
Media
data breaches and their consequences?
Exposure
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Appendix D— Demographics of Primary Study Participants
Demographic
Variable
Gender
Age

Marriage

Internet
Experience

Income

Education

Category
Female
Male
18-24
25-29
30-34
35-44
45- 54
55-65
Over 65
Divorced
Married
Single
Widowed
Below 10
10-15
16-20
Over 20
Below $20,000
$20,000—$39,999
$40,000—$69,999
$70,000—$99,999
$100,000 and over
High school or some
college
Bachelor
Master
Doctorate

Frequency
(Percentage)
403 (49.69)
408 (50.31)
120 (14.80)
176 (21.70)
149 (18.37)
158(19.48)
107(13.19)
73(9.00)
28(3.45)
69 (8.42)
369 (45.05)
374 (45.67)
7 (0.85)
110 (13.43)
162 (19.78)
301 (36.75)
246 (30.04)
83 (10.13)
211 (25.76)
252 (30.77)
156 (19.05)
117 (14.28)
325 (39.68)
381 (46.52)
95 (11.60)
18 (2.20)
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Appedix E— Loadings and Cross-Loadings

dis1
dis2
dis3
dis4
pev1
pev2
pev3
swb1
swb2
swb3
wom1
wom2
wom3

Dissatisfaction
0.90
0.91
0.89
0.86
0.28
0.42
0.39
0.51
0.46
0.46
0.44
0.41
0.45

Perceived Expectancy Violation
0.37
0.39
0.40
0.37
0.74
0.92
0.92
0.18
0.18
0.15
0.16
0.15
0.17
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Switching Behavior
0.49
0.48
0.46
0.42
0.09
0.20
0.17
0.92
0.92
0.92
0.47
0.45
0.53

Negative WOM
0.42
0.41
0.39
0.45
0.10
0.18
0.15
0.50
0.47
0.47
0.93
0.93
0.91

Appendix F— Event Study
To check the robustness of the factorial survey findings, we conduct an event study. We
examine the effects of adopted response strategies and response times on the stock market
reaction. Consistent with the findings of the factorial survey, we investigate if apology and
compensation strategies decrease the negative effects of data breach announcements on
cumulative abnormal return more than no action and corrective action. We also examine if short
response time depreciates the negative consequences of data breaches more than long response
time.
Methodology
We evaluate the effects of data breach response strategies and response time on the
shareholders’ behavior in the stock market (i.e., abnormal stock returns). Because of our interest
in the precise effects of data breaches along with response strategies and time, we employ an
event study to gauge the impact of data breaches with known timestamps on subsequent stock
prices (Hovav et al. 2017; Martin et al. 2017; Yayla and Hu 2011). An event study leverages the
efficient market hypothesis, which states that a stock price at a particular point in time reflects all
available information up to that point (Fama 1998). Any change in the stock price that results
from new information reflects the present value of all expected current and future profits from
that new information.
Data Collection
To analyze the relationship between data breaches and stock returns, we used multiple
sources to ensure that the data collection is as exhaustive as possible. We first identified data
breaches from various sources, such as Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Databreaches.net,
PHIPrivacy.net, US Department of Health and Human Services, and websites of the states
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attorneys general and collected 7250 data breach events. We then removed (a) any ambiguous
breach announcements, (b) the firm was non-US, not-for-profit, or sub-division of a bigger firm,
and (c) the firm was not publicly traded. Thus, we found 496 unique events from 2005-2018 that
includes the only US publicly traded organizations. The dataset incorporates different
information about data breaches, such as the date that the data breach made public, the
explanation of the data breach event, and the type of security attack, etc.
We then attempted to find the official response letters that the breached companies of our
sample provided. We could download 204 response letters incorporating response strategy from
various sources, such as websites of general attorneys, the breached organizations' websites,
security blogs, and online news websites. Event study is subject to confounding events. As the
hypotheses of this study require to estimate longer event windows, we controlled for an array of
confounding events around -1 to +3515, including dividend declarations, contract signings,
earnings information, mergers, and acquisitions, utilizing new technologies (e.g., big data, cloud
computing). We dropped any observation with confounding events, excluding 39 events. Finally,
we use 165 data breach announcements with respect to the response letters for further analysis.
Estimation Method
The standard approach in event studies is to first compute stock return on or around the
date of the event under consideration by applying a market model based on the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM):

15

We choose 35 days to examine the longevity of data breach effect with respect to response strategies that are
provided late as discussed later.
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where Rit is the return in the stock price of the ith firm on day t; Rmt is the total market return on
day t; αi and βi are the intercept and the slope of the market model for firm i, respectively; ℇit is
the disturbance term.
Following the convention of event studies (e.g., Yayla and Hu 2011), we use the equalweighted market index return as the market return in our model and set the estimation period to
120 days, starting at t = -130 days and ending at t = -10 days, where t = 0 day represents the
event date. However, it is important to make a clarification on the security event date. From the
shareholders’ perspective, the meaningful event date for a firm-specific security breach is the day
when the breach becomes public knowledge, which is not necessarily the date when the breach
actually occurred. For example, the event date for a data breach such as unauthorized access of
confidential database resulting in stolen private information is the date the breach incident
becomes publicly available through media announcements. As such, we carefully choose the
appropriate event date for each security breach incident based on the type of breach and the
context of the announcement. With the daily stock return estimated for each firm over the
window of [-130, -10] using the CAPM model, the next step is to compute the abnormal returns,
AR, for firm i at and around the event dates16 t = -1, t = 0 and t = 1, 2, 3… using

16

We calculate the abnormal returns for shorter windows (-1,0), (-1,1), (-1,2), and (-1,3). The logic behind these
event windows is that the stock market may have “pre-announcement” information about the data breach and may
react before the market close a day before the public data breach announcement (Hovav et al. 2017). As we need to
test hypothesis about response time, we also calculated the abnormal returns for longer windows (-1, 30), (-1, 32),
and (-1, 35).
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The abnormal return is the difference between the actual and the expected normal return of the
stock over the event period. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of firm i on this event are then
calculated over the event period using

where t1 and t2 represent the start and end date of the time period in which abnormal returns are
cumulated. For all N firms in the sample, the average CAR can be calculated using

If the calculated CARs are significantly different from zero, then an abnormal return due to the
event is declared, indicating that there is a greater possibility than mere chance that the change(s)
of the stock price(s) of the firm(s) during this time period is (are) caused by the underlying
event(s).
Event Study Results
We use Eventus® (Cowan Research 2007) to apply event study methodology in this
research. Following prior security event studies (e.g., Hovav et al. 2017; Martin et al. 2017;
Yayla and Hu 2011), we adopted the one-factor market model with the equal-weighted market
index (Benarch and Chernobai, 2017; Martin et al. 2017) to conduct the event study and estimate
the CARs. We also did several post-hoc and robustness tests to examine the effect of response
strategies and time and to ensure the accuracy of the results, as discussed later.
Prior research argues that when the events that are not clustered around a specific date,
Patell’s standardized version of test statistic should be used (Benaorch and Chernobai 2017;
Brown & Warner, 1985). Thus, we used Patell’s test because data breaches occurred in different
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periods of time and they were not clustered around a specific day. Figure F1 shows that the mean
of CARs remains negative beyond 30 days of the data breach announcement day. The analyses
of data breach notification letters also show that many breached companies respond to data
breaches several days after data breach announcements. Therefore, we estimate CARs within
longer event windows in addition to event windows.

Figure F1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%): Mean & 95% Confidence Limits
Table F1 shows the results of the event study estimation for the full sample size with
several different event windows, mean CAR, and precision weighted CAAR17. According to
Table 1, the mean of CAR is negative for the event windows, which confirms the negative effect
of data breach announcements on stock prices. In particular, for the one day before and after the
data breach announcements (-1, 1), the mean of CAR for all firms is -0.0078. Figure F1 shows
that the mean of CARs remains negative beyond 30 days of the data breach announcement day.
Thus, we investigated the longevity of the announcements' negative effects by analyzing longer
event windows. The results show that the mean of CAR for (-1, 32) event window is -0.0073,
confirming that the negative effect of data breach announcements lasts long.

17

Precision weighted CAAR is an average standardized cumulative abnormal return (average SCAR).
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Table F1. Results from event analyses using the full sample
Event Windows

Sample Size

Mean CAR

Precision Weighted CAAR

Patell’s Z Test

(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 30)
(-1, 32)
(-1, 35)

165
165
165
165
165
165
165

-0.44%
-0.78%
-0.70%
-0.84%
-0.49%
-0.73%
-0.55%

-0.42%
-0.66%
-0.64%
-0.63%
-0.96%
-1.09%
-0.90%

-2.715**
-3.440***
-2.894**
-2.566**
-1.538$
-1.701*
-1.349$

Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
Analysis of Effect by Response Strategies
We investigated the effect of response strategies on the relationship between data breach
announcements and stock prices using the analysis of sub-samples. To test whether
accommodating response strategies are effective, we divided the sample into the events that the
announcements include the breached company’s response (accommodative strategy) and the
events that the announcement comes without any response (no action). The latter usually happens
when the announcement is made by a third party (e.g., security groups, FBI, journalists, hacker
groups) and not the breached company. In this case, the breached companies usually delay
providing responses to the data breach event. As a result, to accurately capture the effect of
response strategies at the time of the announcement, we only estimated shorter windows. We
further divided the events with accommodative strategies into sub-samples based on the type of
strategy (i.e., corrective action, compensation, and apology) to compare with no-action strategy.
Finally, we also estimated two non-parametric tests— rank test (Corrado 1989) and jackknife test
(Giaccotto and Sfiridis 1996)— because prior research recommends that non-parametric tests be
estimated for the sample sizes below 50 in event studies (Yayla and Hu 2011), which is
consistent with the size of our sub-samples.
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Table F2 shows when a data breach of a company is announced but the breached
company does not provide any response on the day of the announcement (no-action strategy), the
mean of CAR (-1, 1) is -0.0096. When accommodative strategies are announced on the same day
of data breach announcement (we found that both announcements usually come in the same
letter), the mean of CAR (-1, 1) is -0.0060. As both no-action and accommodative strategies
have a significant negative CARs, we ran a t-test to examine if accommodative strategies
significantly decrease the negative effect of data breach announcements on CAR. The results [t
(163) = 1.98, p = 0.04) show that accommodative strategies can significantly decrease the
negative effect of data breach announcements on CAR. While corrective action only has a
significant negative CAR (0.0096, p < 0.05), the results of parametric and non-parametric tests
(Table 2) show that compensation and apology do not have significant effects on CARs. Table
F2 shows that while compensation is more effective than corrective action only, its efficacy is
not more than that of apology.
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Table F2. Results from event analyses of response types
Response
Strategy

Event
Sample Mean
Windows Size
CAR

No Action

(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)
(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)

Accommodative

Corrective
Action Only

Corrective &
Compensation

Corrective &
Apology

37
37
37
37
129
129
129
129
28
28
28
28
29
29
29
29
25
25
25
25

-0.56%
-0.96%
-0.70%
-1.15%
-0.30%
-0.60%
-0.50%
-0.57%
-0.70%
-1.37%
-2.02%
-1.07%
-0.07%
-0.77%
-0.69%
-1.50%
-0.02%
0.28%
0.71%
0.59%

Precision
Weighted
CAAR
-0.59%
-0.82%
-0.88%
-0.96%
-0.30%
-0.53%
-0.45%
-0.41%
-0.82%
-1.24%
-1.81%
-1.23%
-0.11%
-0.56%
-0.46%
-0.73%
0.09%
0.40%
0.59%
0.54%

Patell’s
Z Test

Rank Z
Test

Jackknife
Z Test

-1.846*
-2.100*
-1.945*
-1.920*
-1.685*
-2.393**
-1.765*
-1.445$
-2.003*
-2.486**
-3.143***
-1.910*
-0.29
-1.197
-0.851
-1.214
0.214
0.802
1.024
0.836

-1.188
-1.533$
-1.456$
-1.573$
-1.583$
-2.280*
-1.690*
-1.603*
-2.344**
-2.840**
-3.569***
-2.466**
-0.253
-1.012
-0.727
-1.17
0.17
0.756
0.841
0.569

-1.405$
-1.574$
-1.643$
-1.790*
-1.062
-1.952*
-1.414$
-1.108*
-2.329**
-3.088**
-3.689***
-2.117*
-0.049
-0.904
-0.527
-0.788
0.63
0.823
1.135
0.649

Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
Analysis of Effect by Response Time
In order to investigate the effect of response time on the efficacy of response strategies,
we divided the sample into the responses that are derived from the data breach announcements
(short-time responses) and the responses that are provided after data breach announcements
(Late-time responses). Table F3 shows the descriptive of late time response events.
Table F3. Descriptive of Late Response Events
Sample Size Mean S.D.
Late Response (Days) 37
10.5 8.71

Median
14

Min
3

Max
30

The full sample results (Table F1 and Figure F1) show that the data breach
announcement’s negative effect on the mean of CAR has longevity and remains negative even
after 30 days. However, we test whether short responses are more effective and have shorter
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negative effects. To compare the means of CARs between short-time responses and late-time
responses, we estimate longer event windows (-1, 30), (-1, 32), and (-1, 35) as the maxim late
response day is 30 (Table F3). To this end, we divided the sample into two sub-samples (shorttime responses and late-time responses) and compared their means of CARs. Figure F2 shows
that the event windows (-1, 30), (-1, 32), and (-1, 35) incorporate short response events as well as
late responses that were delivered on different days after the data breach announcements.
Event Window
Announcement Day
for Short and Late
Responses

T = -1

T=0

T=3

Short Responses Late Responses
Delivery
Delivery (Min)

T = 10
Late Responses
Delivery (Mean)

T = 30

T = 35

Late Responses
Delivery (Max)

Figure F2. Short and Late Responses
Table F4 shows that while the means of CARs for short response events are small and
non-significant, those for late responses are large and significant. For example, the mean of car
for late responses (-1, 35) is -0.0284. Thus, the considerable difference between the means of
CARs for short and late responses indicates that the response time affects the effectiveness of
response strategies.
Table F4. Results from event analyses of response time
Response
Time

Event
Sample
Windows Size

Short Time
Response

(-1, 30)
(-1, 32)
(-1, 35)
(-1, 30)
(-1, 32)
(-1, 35)

Late Time
Response

129
129
129
37
37
37

Equal-Weighted Market Index
Mean
Precision
Patell’s Z
CAR
Weighted
Test
CAAR
-0.07% -0.78%
-1.088
-0.19% -0.81%
-1.094
0.04% -0.52%
-0.675
-2.04% -1.89%
-1.508$
-2.79% -2.37%
-1.821*
-2.84% -2.64%
-1.946*

Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
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Rank Z
Test

Jackknife
Z Test

-0.368
-0.551
-0.347
-1.712*
-2.041*
-2.069*

-1.058
-1.154
-0.95
-1.154
-1.458$
-1.488$

Post-hoc Analysis
To understand whether the combination of all strategies depreciates the negative effect of
data breach announcements on the mean of CARs more than compensation and apology, we first
conducted an event study with the sub-sample of corrective & compensation & apology. Table
F5 shows that the combination of all strategies akin to compensation and apology can avert the
negative effect of data breach announcements on CARs. Then, we ran a one-way ANOVA test to
examine if the combination of all three strategies can affect the relationship between the
announcements and CARs more than compensation and apology. The results [F (2, 98) = 0.869,
p = 0.423] show that there is not a significant difference among the means of CARs. Thus, the
combination of corrective & compensation & apology is not more effective than compensation
and apology and subsequently, the effects of strategies are not additive.
Table F5. Results from event analyses of the response strategies combination
Response
Strategy

Event
Windows

Sample
Size

Corrective+
Compensation+
Apology

(-1, 0)
(-1, 1)
(-1, 2)
(-1, 3)

47
47
47
47

Equal-Weighted Market Index
Mean
Precision Patell’s Z
CAR
Weighted Test
CAAR
-0.35% -0.35%
-1.218
-0.61% -0.58%
-1.212
-0.40% -0.38%
-0.943
-0.54% -0.38%
-0.848

Rank Z
Test

Jackknife
Z Test

-0.354
-1.022
0.120
-0.068

-0.540
-1.241
-0.529
-0.416

Robustness Tests
We conducted several robustness tests to ensure the quality of the findings. While we
followed prior security event studies (e.g., Martin et al. 2017) to estimate the main analyses with
the market model, we conducted Fama-French three-factor model and Fama-French-momentum
four-factor model as alternative specifications. Table F6 shows the estimation of alternative
models for the full sample, Table F7 shows the results of sub-samples regarding H2 and H3, and
Table 8 shows the new estimations for H4. The estimations of all alternative models are
consistent with each other and with the market model as the main analysis of the study.
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Table F6. Results of mean CARs stemming from different estimation methods
Event Windows Sample Size Fama-French 3-Factor
Fama-French 4-Factor
Model
Model
(-1, 0)
165
-0.43%**
-0.33%*
(0, 0)
165
-0.41%***
-0.36% **
(0, 1)
165
-0.73%***
-0.36% ***
(-1, 1)
165
-0.75%***
-0.62%**
(-1, 2)
165
-0.72%***
-0.61%**
(-1, 3)
165
-0.89%**
-0.78%**
(-1, 30)
165
-0.62%*
-0.46%
(-1, 32)
165
-0.86%*
-0.64%$
(-1, 35)
165
-0.68%$
-0.56%
Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
Table F7. Results of mean CARs of different response strategies stemming from different
estimation methods
Response
Event
Sample
Fama-French
Fama-French
Strategy
Windows
Size
3-Factor Model
4-Factor Model
No Action

(-1, 0)
37
-0.69% *
(-1, 1)
37
-1.09%$
(-1, 2)
37
-0.93%*
(-1, 3)
37
-1.36%*
Accommodative (-1, 0)
129
-0.29% *
(-1, 1)
129
-0.58%**
(-1, 2)
129
-0.53%*
(-1, 3)
129
-0.64%*
Corrective Only (-1, 0)
28
-0.51%**
(-1, 1)
28
-1.31%***
(-1, 2)
28
-2.02%***
(-1, 3)
28
-1.21%**
Compensation
(-1, 0)
29
-0.07%
(-1, 1)
29
-0.73%
(-1, 2)
29
-0.67%
(-1, 3)
29
-1.40%
Apology
(-1, 0)
25
0.02%
(-1, 1)
25
0.32%
(-1, 2)
25
0.74%
(-1, 3)
25
0.62%
Corrective &
(-1, 0)
47
-0.18%
Compensation & (-1, 1)
47
-0.46%
Apology
(-1, 2)
47
-0.20%
(-1, 3)
47
-0.45%
Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001.
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-0.67%$
-1.01%$
-0.92%*
-1.40%*
-0.22%$
-0.48%*
-0.48%*
-0.65%*
-0.81%***
-1.59%***
-2.19%***
-1.30%**
-0.02%
-0.63%
-0.52%
-1.29%
0.01%
0.23%
0.67%
0.53%
-0.20%
-0.39%
-0.20%
-0.50%

Table F8. Results from event analyses of response time with different estimation methods
Response Time
Event
Sample
Fama-French
Fama-French 4Windows
Size
3-Factor Model
Factor Model
Short Response Time
(-1, 30)
128
-0.11%
-0.11%
(-1, 32)
128
-0.24%
-0.18%
(-1, 35)
128
-0.05%
-0.09%
Late Response Time
(-1, 30)
37
-2.54%*
-1.78%$
(-1, 32)
37
-3.28%*
-2.49%*
(-1, 35)
37
-3.29%*
-2.56%*
Note. $P<0.10, * P<0.05.
Conclusion
We conducted an event study to seek the effects of adopted response strategies and
response times. The results of the factorial survey show that accommodative response strategies
can decrease the negative effects and the results of the event study (Table F2) similarly show the
influential role of accommodative response strategies. The factorial survey results show that
while corrective action is not impactful, apology and compensation can decrease the negative
consequences of data breaches. The event study shows the same results (Table F2): contrast to
corrective action, apology and compensation can decrease the negative effects of data breach
announcements on CAR. Both factorial survey results and event study results show that if the
breached companies provide responses early after data breach event, they can depreciate the
negative outcomes of data breaches more than providing the responses late. Post-hoc analyses of
both studies also show that the combination of all corrective action, apology, and compensation
is effective but not more than apology and compensation alone. Overall, the results of the event
study are consistent with the results of the factorial survey, indicating the robustness of findings.
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Dissertation Conclusions
Due to the importance of valuable information in business growth, companies strive to
intelligently store, process, and use business information (e.g., marketing, sales, trade secrets,
software codes). However, companies’ valuable information is threatened by data breaches that
disclose confidential business data. The information disclosure considerably impairs breached
companies economically and non-economically. Although companies invest in information
security to protect their data against data breaches, the figures show that data breach events are
on the rise (Sanders 2019). It suggests that data breach incidents like other crises are complex
events that encompass different facets. A rigorous review of data breach studies reveals that
there is a need to find various aspects of data breaches and examine their effects on the
stakeholders—whose actions financially influence the breached companies. Thus, this
dissertation has attempted to identify various data breach attributes and examined the data breach
characteristics on customers and shareholders as the key stakeholders. In particular, essay 1
focuses on the data breach characteristics that appear in the data breach announcements. It also
examines whether announcement source and form are impactful on customers and shareholders.
In essay 2, we identified company responses that are given to stakeholders after data breaches
and investigated response times based on data breach notification laws. We then examined the
effects of various response strategies and response times on customers and shareholders in essay
2.
Essay 1
Stakeholders realize a data breach event from public announcements and reciprocate
based on the statements of data breaches. Despite various data breach classifications in prior
research (e.g., Posey et al., 2017; Yayla and Hu 2011), essay 1 discusses a data breach
classification based on pieces of information that exist in the public announcements. To do so,
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we did a content analysis of 403 data breach announcements to categorize various attributes of
data breaches. We found that the announcements provide information about data breach event
namely attack characteristics (source and strategy) and disclosed information characteristics
(sensitivity and severity). Essay 1 also uses the social-mediated communication model to argue
that the announcements can be categorized based on source and form. We conducted two studies
to examine these various data breach characteristics stemming from announcements on
customers and shareholders. In study 1, we conducted a series of experiments with 849
participants to examine customers and an event study with 403 data breach incidents to
investigate shareholders.
We found that these characteristics have differential effects on the stakeholders. We also
found that characteristics affect customers and shareholders the same. More specifically, we
found that external attack is more influential than internal attack and there is no difference
between digital and physical attacks. Sensitive information stimulates negative customer’s
behaviors (switching behavior and negative WOM) and negatively affects the stock market. The
results suggest that while severity is important for customers and a data breach with more
disclosed records leads to negative behaviors, it does not affect shareholders to sell stocks at
lower prices. Our results also suggest important insights into data breach post-event
characteristics (i.e., announcement attributes). More specifically, we found that when a data
breach is announced by a third party, it provides more negative effects to customers and
shareholders than when it is announced by the breached company. Finally, the results reveal that
social media can intensify the negative effects of data breach events on customers and
shareholders. These findings not only contribute to data breach research to identify influential
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attributes on two main stakeholders but also help the companies to better invest in information
security and announce data breaches.
Essay 2
Companies create response plans to mitigate the negative percussions of data breaches.
Crisis management research and information security affirm company response can replenish the
loss after a data breach. However, these responses vary and each company adopts a response to
its best interest. Essay 2 first investigated breached companies’ response plans to identify various
responses in a data breach aftermath. To do this end, essay 2 did a content analysis of official
response letters that breached companies issued after data breaches. The results show that the
breached companies mainly employ each or a combination of accommodative strategies, namely
corrective action, apology, and compensation. We also found that some companies decide to
remain silent probably to hide data breach incidents—a strategy that is named no action. Aside
from the response strategy, breached companies provide responses at different times. Data
breach responses are affected by data breach notification laws that require breached companies
to notify the affected stakeholders after a data breach. However, each U.S. state has a different
legal period that allows the breached companies to delay their responses.
Essay 2 used expectancy violation theory to argue that a data breach provides a shock to
individuals and subsequently individuals show negative behaviors. In this essay, we conducted a
factorial survey (n = 811) that includes 15 conditions with different response strategies and
response times. We found that breached companies should avoid no action strategy and attempt
to respond to data breaches. The results also show that while corrective action is not influential, a
simple apology can be as effective as compensation. We also found that short response time
increases the potency of response strategies. We also tested the combinations of strategies but we
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did not find additive effects. Finally, we did a robustness check by conducting an event study
with 165 response letters and found the same results of the factorial survey.
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